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CORPORATE AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: A
MODEL PENAL APPROACH FOR LEGAL
DETERRENCE TO THEFT OF CORPORATE
TRADE SECRETS AND PROPRIETARY
BUSINESS INFORMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime knows few limits when greed is at stake and technology is a
weapon.' Intel, the computer chip maker has revolutionized the
computer industry through the invention of a single product, the
Pentium processor.2 Intel developed the current Pentium processor
through years of research, development and modification.3 However,
through the unscrupulous acts of one person, the company's competitors
could have obtained the information necessary to produce an identical
product for a fraction of the cost, effort and time, threatening to put Intel
out of business. 4 Recently, an employee at Intel decided to steal the
blueprints for the Pentium processor.5 The employee attempted to
download the files to a remote site, his home computer. 6 While the
computer files could be viewed remotely by authorized people, Intel's
internal computer system would not allow these critical files to be
I Jeffrey Young, Spies Like Us, FORBES, June 3,1996, at 70.
2 Of the 83 million computer machines sold during 1997, the Intel chip powered over ninety
percent. Joshua Cooper Ramo, A Survivor's Tale, TIME, Dec. 29, 1997, at 54. Ramo
characterizes Intel as a "super efficient firm with monopoly like returns gliding past
competitors and, not incidentally, racking up huge profits". Id. at 58. For the fiscal year
1996, Intel produced revenue totaling $ 26 billion and recorded profits of $ 6 billion. 1998
Intel Annual Report (visited Apr. 19, 1999)
<http://www.intel.com/intel/annual98/summary.htm>. Both figures represent record
marks for Intel. Id. The company attributes these records to "rapid market acceptance of
the Pentium processor and the Pentium processor with MMX technology, both of which
were introduced in 1997." Id.
3 A conservative survey estimates that Intel expended sums of money in the range of
several hundred million dollars and years of exploration to develop cutting edge
technology which eventually produced a product that could be marketed and sold in mass
quantities. Pete Carey, Software Engineer Charged in Theft of Pentium Plans from Intel, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at A8. According to 1997 data, Intel spends approximately
$2.67 billion on research and development annually. 1998 Intel Annual Report (visited Apr.
19, 1999) <http://www.intel.com/intel/annual98/summary.htm>. This represents 10
percent of total sales and accounts for one of Intel's largest single expenses. Id.
4 Michelle Cole, Proliferation of High Tech Firms Fosters Espionage, IDAHO STATESMAN, April
28, 1997, at 10B.
5 Cole, supra note 4, at 10B.
6Id.
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downloaded. 7 However, this safeguard failed to deter the industrious
thief.8 Rather than giving up, the employee displayed the files on the
computer and proceeded to videotape each screen.9  With the
information stored on tape, the employee possessed the information
necessary to exactly duplicate the company's flagship product while
only spending minimal amounts of money, time and effort.10 While the
employee was arrested prior to transmitting this information to any third
party, this narrative illustrates the rapidly growing problem of economic,
corporate and industrial espionage upon the welfare of U.S.
corporations.1
As the example illustrates, "economic espionage is hardly a novel
practice." 12 Currently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has
approximately 800 probes pending involving theft of corporate trade
7Id.
sId.
9Id.
1o Id. Intel valued the information recorded in the theft in the "'tens of millions of dollars'".
Carey, supra note 3, at A8: However, this figure does not account for the potential loss to
sales, profits, competitive advantage, and market share. Id.
11 The employee was eventually sentenced to 33 months in prison after pleading guilty to
violating both the federal mail fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property
statutes. Cole, supra note 4. See infra notes 52-84 for a discussion of both federal statutes.
See also Ben Winton, Intel Theft a Frame-Up?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 26, 1995, at Al; Man
Charged in Theft of Trade Secrets, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 26, 1995, at 8; FBI Arrests Man in
Theft of Secrets of Pentium, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 25, 1995, at A3; Engineer Who Stole
Pentium Chip Secret Gets Prison Term, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 25,1996, at A14. See also
infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text discussing the rising problem of theft of
confidential business information.
12 Stan Crock, Business Spies: The New Enemy Within?, Bus. WK., February 10, 1997, at 16.
"The ground rules have changed, and the battlefield is now economic rather than
ideological, but espionage in the 1990's springs directly from the ruins of the Cold War spy
regimes." JOHN F. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: EcONOMIc ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA
(1997) (jacket cover). In a bitterly contested lawsuit still pending, Dow Chemical won a
restraining order to prevent General Electric (GE) from exploiting trade secrets regarding
the plastic casing surrounding a car's instrument panel invented and manufactured by
Dow Chemical. Richard Waters, Not Spying, Just Hiring, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 3,1997 at 7. Dow
Chemical alleged that GE had made a calculated play to gain knowledge of Dow's
manufacturing process, design, and marketing initiatives by hiring 14 employees from
Dow's plastics division and placing the workers in similar jobs where they would
inevitably use their former employer's trade secrets. Id. at 8. Disputes like this and the
controversy between General Motors (GM) and Volkswagen in the early 1990s demonstrate
the widespread problem of what is generally termed industrial, economic, or corporate
espionage. For a detailed discussion of the GM and Volkswagen dispute, see Richard J.
Reibstein, Protecting Secrets and Personnel from the 'Lopez Effect', N.Y. L.J., Dec. 17, 1996, at 1.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss2/8
19991 CORPORATE AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 765
secrets by foreign countries alone.13 For 1997, estimates measure the
economic loss to U.S. corporations at over three hundred billion
dollars.14 The importance of protecting intellectual property rights of
U.S. corporations is paramount in today's technologically based
economy.15
13 Ronald E. Yates, Corporate Cloak and Dagger, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 1, 1996, at Bi. This translates
to a 100% increase in the FBI caseload over the previous year. Id. Furthermore, a survey
released in 1996 indicates a 323% increase in reported incidents over the four-year period
from 1992-1995. Crock, supra note 12, at 16. More importantly, recent investigations have
discovered over 23 foreign countries are directly engaging in covert espionage activity,
while over 100 foreign countries have spent public funds to help companies obtain
American technology and corporate trade secrets. Yates, supra note 13, at BI. France,
Germany, Israel, China, Russia and South Korea were named as major offenders. Jack
Nelson, Spies Took $300 Billion Toll on U.S. Firms in '97: FBI Says Espionage is Increasing, With
at Least 23 Governments Targeting American Companies, LOS ANGELES TIMES, January 12,1998,
at Al. Nelson reports that over 1,100 documented incidents of economic espionage were
reported to the FBI by major companies last year. Id.
14 Nelson, supra note 13, at Al. Nelson reports this figure as representing the first national
survey undertaken by the FBI and its agent Edwin Fraumann to quantify the intellectual
property losses from both foreign and domestic espionage on U.S. based companies. Id.
Other estimates quantify the economic loss from 20 billion up to 100 billion dollars
annually. Yates, supra note 13, at Bi. A compounding problem with accurately measuring
the actual impact on the U.S. economy is the failure of corporations to detect and to report
theft of trade secrets and proprietary information. Yates, supra note 13, at B1. An FBI
spokesman explained, "You never hear about successful economic espionage cases. They
can go on for years without anybody knowing it." Id. See also IRA S. WINCLER, CORPORATE
ESPIONAGE 166-70 (1997) (Some companies' security systems may be so lax that a company
is simply unaware that information has been stolen). Thousands of cases escape detection
each year and thousands of cases are detected and never reported by corporations. Id. The
practical reasons corporations may decline to pursue an action result from the fear that
publicity will directly impair their stock value, customer confidence, and business
competitiveness. See generally Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret
Information: A Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAW. 887 (1988); R. EELS & P. NEHEMXIS,
CORPORATE INTELIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE 118 (1984) (Most executives would rather bury
the losses in earning statements than admit they have lost the family jewels). However, I
will argue the main reason for reluctance to report economic espionage is the lack of
effective laws to adequately punish and deter such activity. This is the basis for the thesis
of this Note and for developing a model penal statute. See infra Sections 11,111, IV.
1As Senator Rockefeller advised,
Intellectual property is the seed corn that builds our national income,
our social well-being, and our national competitiveness. When the
intellectual property of Americans is not protected, our country loses
not only jobs, production and profits today, but also our ability to
undertake the research and the investments that lead to further
technological progress tomorrow.
Peter J. G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under Federal Law, 22 PEPP. L. REV.
59, 60 n.5 (1994). See also JOHN F. FiALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN
AMERICA (1997). "[T]he secret operations of America's enemies (and friends) threaten to
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Corporate trade secrets and proprietary information represent the
most valuable economic and business resource for gaining competitive
advantage and market share in the U.S. free market economy. 16 The U.S.
economy depends on increased efficiency, productivity and
technological advancement gained through the development and
implementation of new processes, products and services.17 However,
this global economic environment fosters a powerful incentive for
corporations, individuals and foreign governments to use improper and
illegal means to gain the competitive advantage and market share
necessary to survive and prosper.18  Furthermore, as technology
hollow out the U.S. economy and siphon away the jobs and technologies we need to remain
competitive in the twenty-first century." Id. at book jacket cover. Louis Freeh, the acting
director of the FBI, related the significance of economic espionage while testifying before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stating "The theft, misappropriation, and
wrongful receipt, transfer, and use of United States proprietary economic
information.. .directly imperils the health and competitiveness of our economy." Hearing
on Economic Espionage Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1718 (1996) (statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation). As described by the Honorable Richard Posner, "The future of the nation
depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of industry
depends on the protection of intellectual property." Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174,180 (7th Cir. 1991).
16 Information is the currency of competition. Epstein & Levi, supra note 14, at 887. A
company's ability to be successful depends on its ability to acquire and maintain business
information. Id. at 889. Moreover, gathering this information is time consuming and
expensive. Don Weisner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REv. 1076,
(1988). Also, through technology and deregulation, a competitor can take the lead in an
industry with a single innovation. Crock, supra note 12, at 17. Without valuable
proprietary information and trade secrets, today's archrival may not be on the playing field
tomorrow. The significance and importance of corporate trade secrets and proprietary
business information cannot be understated in today's global economy. Louis Freeh,
director of the FBI explained, "The development and production of proprietary economic
information is an integral part of virtually every aspect of United States trade, commerce,
and business and hence, is essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of
critical segments of the United States economy." Hearing on Economic Espionage Before the
Senate Select Committee On Intelligence And Senate Committee On The Judiciary, 104th. Cong.
1718 (1996) (statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). President
Clinton recently stated, "Trade secrets are an integral part of virtually every sector of our
economy and are essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of critical
industries operating in the United States." President Signs Economic Espionage Act, J. OF
PROPRIETARY inS., Oct. 1996, at 15, 23. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17 Epstein and Levi, supra note 14, at 890.
18 Why steal? This is somewhat self explanatory upon an understanding of the value of
business information. See supra notes 15-16. Two factors also contribute to the mechanics
of why companies steal proprietary information. First, obtaining and exploiting other
people's work rather than creating and developing information from scratch is more
simple, easy, and cost effective. See infra note 19. Widespread employee mobility and the
sophisticated surveillance methods explain this theory. See infra note 19. Second, the
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advances, the methods for stealing corporate trade secrets and
proprietary information are becoming highly sophisticated, less
expensive and easier to implement.19 Therefore, U.S. criminal law must
general business environment where earnings, profits, and stock price dictate whether a
company is a success or failure provides a powerful motivation to cut comers and employ
any means necessary to quickly bring new products and services to market in order to
grow revenues and profits (or implementing a new process or strategy to reduce costs). See
supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. A representative example comes from
Massachusetts. Charles Sennott, Shadowy World of Spying, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Feb. 2,1997,
at 2F. FBI agents set up a sting after a theft of genetically altered cells occurred at a
subsidiary of Genzyme. Id. Documents stated that with the stolen cells and a one million
dollar investment the company receiving this information could produce a product that
would otherwise cost over two hundred million dollars to develop. Id. As illustrated by
this example, rather than expending years of time and huge sums of money to develop a
competing product, the competitors realized that simply copying a proven formula would
be easier, less expensive, and less risky. Id. The real fraud, as the example points out, was
an attempt to bypass costly research and development and gain access to a potential
market of two billion dollars through illegal theft. Id. The problem lies not in fostering
competition among firms which produces a wider variety of products at a higher level of
quality and lower price. The problem lies in the fact that stealing and misappropriating
provides a disincentive to develop new technologies and processes. Rather than investing
in research and development, it is easier and less expensive to pirate other corporation's
business information. As Ben Venzke, publisher of the Washington-based Intelligence
Watch Report, explains, "the underlying philosophy is why spend ten years and one billion
dollars on research and development when you can bribe a competitor's engineer for one
million dollars and get the same, if not better, results." Id. The bottom line is "Companies
are willing to do anything and go anywhere to get a competitive edge." Jeff Louderback,
Paper Chase: Every Business is Susceptible to Theft and Espionage and the Danger Lurks in the
Places You'd Least Expect, DAYON SMALL BUS. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1996, at 6.
19 Virtually every sophisticated espionage tactic used during the Cold War is being used
today against American companies. Yates, supra note 13, at B1. Methods for stealing
valuable corporate information include dumpster diving (rummaging through corporate
trash receptacles), data dipping (hacking into computer databases, allowing data to be
viewed and duplicated through remote computer modem access) and inserting electronic
eavesdropping equipment such as phone taps, wireless microphones, and mini-cameras
placed strategically in air ducts, office walls, and baseboard heaters. Id. See also Nelson,
supra note 13, at Al (intrusive methods include eavesdropping by wiretapping and
bugging offices, bribing suppliers and employees, planting "moles" in a company, and
stealing floppy disks and CD-ROMS); Young, supra note 1, at 70. As Young illustrates the
majority of vital corporate data is stored on computers and network servers with varying
degrees of security. Id. at 73. Furthermore, Young illuminates the potential danger,
"People do things in the computer environment that they would never do outside". Id. at
71. An example depicts this theory. Id. "Most people would not steal a car, but what
about copying a customer database file or the internal pricing spreadsheet of a
competitor?" Id. It is important to contrast competitive intelligence and illegal espionage.
Competitive intelligence can be used both tactically and strategically. Crock, supra note 12,
at 17. It borrows tools and methods from strategic planning, which takes a broad view of
the market and how a particular company hopes to position itself. Id. at 17. Analysts study
everything from rivals' new products and manufacturing costs to profiles of executives. Id.
Competitive intelligence serves as a radar screen, spotting new opportunities or helping to
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address the growing importance and significance of protecting trade
secrets and proprietary information. 20 Moreover, the U.S. legal system
must implement a powerful criminal deterrent to combat the simple,
inexpensive and sophisticated methods of theft, which are virtually
effortless to implement, but extremely difficult to detect. 21
The theft of corporate trade secrets22 and proprietary information
has largely been protected through the remedies availed in civil
avert disaster. Id. Competitive or corporate intelligence becomes illegal espionage when it
involves the theft of proprietary information, materials, or trade secrets. Id. at 17. The
distinction becomes difficult to ascertain given the potential to draw lines on ethical and
legal grounds. Stealing price sheets from a corporate office would be both ethically wrong
and illegal. However, expressing an interest in a job to find out a rival's new product plans
may be devoid of ethics, but a gray area exists as to whether this is an illegal practice. To
further confuse the issue, two authors have described various methods for stealing trade
secrets ethically. See Weisner & Cava, supra note 16, at 1076. This Note does not attempt to
explain or contradict the distinction between the ethical and legal aspects of competitive
intelligence and illegal espionage. This Note devotes its attention to providing an adequate
deterrent to preventing illegal espionage through actual theft of trade secrets and
proprietary information.
2 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.21See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
2 Trade secrets are, "any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). In determining whether the
proprietary information is protected by qualifying as a formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information, six factors are delineated by the Restatement:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of an
individual's business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.
Id. For a further discussion of competing definitions of a trade secret, see Gale R. Peterson,
Trade Secrets in an lnformation Age, 32 Hous. L. REV 385, 389-92 (1995). Another influential
definition of a trade secret, one adopted by numerous states in promulgating trade secret
laws comes from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). Id. The UTSA defines a trade
secret as follows:
information including a formula, patter, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 1-11, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985). The fundamental basis and intent
of both definitions are similar as they both focus on the presence of value and competitive
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litigation.23 However, for numerous reasons, the remedies available to
companies through civil litigation fail to provide the equivalent deterrent
of criminal laws on theft of trade secrets by corporate spies.24 First, the
purpose of criminal sanctions is punitive and seeks to deter socially
undesirable activity.25 Criminal sanctions seek to provide a penalty with
the goal of preventing the behavior from occurring in the future, while
punishing the past behavior. 26 In contrast, civil law sanctions serve the
purpose of compensation and returning the party to a preexisting status
quo.27 Second, criminal and civil sanctions produce different remedies.28
Criminal sanctions place an inherent stigma on the individual, with
punishment being the conventional device for the expression of attitudes
of resentment and indignation.29 Criminal sanctions produce a remedy
of symbolic significance missing from other penalties. 3° Civil sanctions
remedy the problem in an entirely different manner, most notably
through monetary disbursements. 31 Criminal law serves as a proactive
advantage while detailing secrecy requirements. Peterson, supra note 22, at 387-88. See
infra Sections H and III for an analysis of federal and state criminal statutory law definitions
of trade secrets.
23Corporations most frequently have two potential avenues under which to bring civil
lawsuits. First, many businesses employ covenants not to compete, nondisclosure
agreements and confidentiality agreements with their employees. David Cathcart,
Contracts with Employees: Covenants Not To Compete and Trade Secrets, 36 AL-ABA 87, 100
(1997). All three agreements are similar in substance and allow the company to bring a
lawsuit for breach of contract or for breach of fiduciary duty if an employee discloses
protected information. Id. Secondly, companies have the option of bringing a lawsuit for
misappropriation of a trade secret under state tort law. Id. Over 40 states recognize the tort
of misappropriation of trade secrets. Jonathan Band, The Economic Espionage Act: Its
Application in Year One, CORP. COUNS., Nov. 1997, at 1. These states follow most aspects of
the UTSA including its definition of trade secrets. See supra note 22. Utilizing this
approach, the corporation can seek injunctive relief and monetary damages. See infra notes
24-33 detailing the advantages and disadvantages of civil law remedies.
24 A succinct statement of the problem is that criminal liability is a far more effective
deterrent than civil liability because "a long prison sentence puts the fear of God into
people much more effectively than a slap on the wrist." Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
2
5Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE L.J. 1795,1807 (1992).
261d.
v Id.
2SId.
29 Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1983).
30 Id. The "stigma theory" of criminal punishment is justified on three basis. First, the actor
is blameworthy in causing the harm. Id. at 1148. Second, the harm is unwanted. Id. at
1147. Third, the stigma will have a deterrent effect on future behavior. Id.
31 Steiker, supra note 24, at 783. The nature of each sanction serves different purposes and
corrects behavior through competing remedies. Id.
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approach to deterring the problem before it occurs, while civil law serves
to compensate the victim for activity that has harmed the individual. 32
For these reasons, civil litigation serves important interests in this area
other than deterrence.3 However, compared to other intellectual
property laws, civil trade secret laws have the potential to provide a
more effective and comprehensive legal protection.34 This dichotomous
relationship has the potential to adequately protect corporations and
businesses from theft and misappropriation of trade secrets through
separate, but related remedies.3 Civil trade secret laws provide an
effective defensive approach, while criminal trade secret laws provide a
powerful proactive deterrent to combat the growing simplicity and ease
of theft.3 However, while state civil trade secret laws and remedies in
this area provide an effective defensive response, current state criminal
32 Id. at 784-86. Expanding on this theory, protecting trade secrets through civil litigation
provides an effective defensive response. Id. Corporations may decline to pursue civil
litigation because the financial resources, combined with the time and effort needed to
investigate and bring the lawsuit, will produce civil penalties that are light, insignificant,
and provide inadequate compensation relative to the loss incurred. Id. Civil litigation also
suffers from three inherent drawbacks. Id. First, even with a civil law injunction, the secret
information has been publicized. Id. Second, damage awards never fully compensate the
victim, particularly when the individual thief is judgment proof. M. Third, the primary
focus during the civil lawsuit is on whether the information qualifies as a trade secret and
becomes removed from the misconduct of the party. Id.
33 Gerald Mossinghoff, The Economic Espionage Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret
Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 191 (1997).
34 Peterson, supra note 22, at 386. Contrasted with protection given to patents and
copyrights, trade secret protection is immediate, unlimited in duration, and does not
require government action in licensing or registration. Id. at 386. Furthermore, trade secret
protection is broader, covering a variety of information that is not explicitly covered under
patent, copyright, or trademark protection. Id. Examples of information that would
classify as a trade secret, but not a patent, copyright, or trademark include marketing plans,
financial information, customer and supplier lists, designs, drawings, and technological
strategies. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld trade secret laws against a claim of
preemption by federal patent law. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-93
(1974). For a more detailed analysis see Epstein & Levi, supra note 14, at 887. As these
authors point out, the trade secret process is cheaper and quicker to implement than the
patent process. Id. Furthermore, unlike patent law, there is no subject matter requirement
to obtain trade secret protection, thus creating more flexibility and expanded coverage and
protection. Id. at 888. Finally, for most corporations trade secret protection allows the
information to remain confidential, which is a better strategy than publicizing the
information through use of a patent or copyright. See generally Cindy Collins, Trade Secrets:
The Economic Espionage Act, Friend or Foe?, INSIDE LmGATION, Sept. 1997, at 14.
3s See supra notes 22-34.
36 See supra notes 22-34.
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trade secret laws fail to provide an effective deterrent to the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets.37
The main objective of this Note is to propose an effective legal
method to deter the theft of trade secrets and proprietary business
information using the criminal justice system of both the federal and
state courts.3 Section ]I of this Note details the various criminal law
sanctions and penalties under current federal statutory law, including
the recently promulgated Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA).39 This
Section also briefly details the judicial interpretation of these various
federal statutes.4° Furthermore, this Section discusses various practical
problems and illustrates the weaknesses of addressing these problems
through federal government intervention.41
Section III of this Note evaluates the current state criminal law
approaches regarding trade secret theft, including an analysis of the
sanctions and penalties currently in effect.42 Unfortunately, most of the
current state law approaches (for different reasons than current federal
law) are inadequate, outdated, and lack sufficient deterrence to combat
the dangers and importance of protecting trade secrets and corporate
proprietary information.43 Section IV of this Note proposes a response to
these problems by creating a model criminal penal code combining the
strongest aspects of the EEA and state law statutory approaches to create
powerful criminal sanctions which will provide the best possible
deterrent effect on corporate spies in America.44 This tool will provide
the states that have not adopted any criminal statutes regarding the theft
3 See infra Section Il.
-8 This is complicated naturally by many practical aspects discussed in supra notes 18-19.
The problem is two-fold. "American companies are like innocent children in the forest.
They have no idea how many wolves are after them." Yates, supra note 13, at B1. The more
troubling aspect is that many companies are not ignorant, but arrogant. Id. This has been
described as the "head in the sand approach". Id. Many companies are simply not willing
to look at it because they do not think they are targets. Id. While a model criminal penal
code will not solve all of these problems directly, an effective criminal deterrent approach
is far superior to the current legal protection available to corporations. See infra Section IV.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West Supp. 1998). See infra notes 95-117 and accompanying
text.40 See infra notes 61-73, 79-84 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
42 See infra Section [IB.
4See infra Section IC.
4See infra Section IV.
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of trade secrets a viable, detailed, and illustrative model to assist in
passing legislation.' 5
II. FEDERAL STATUTORY APPROACH TO THE PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS
A. Introduction
Prior to 1996, federal prosecutors attempted to use a patchwork of
three federal statutes to prosecute individuals for theft or
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential business
information.46  However, all three federal statutes, The Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property Act (ITSA), 47 Wire Fraud statutes,48
and Mail Fraud statutes49 were clearly not originally designed to cover
trade secrets and proprietary business informations ° In 1996, Congress
attempted to remedy the problem by providing a comprehensive federal
statute directly addressing the theft of trade secrets and confidential
business information entitled the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).51 This
Section will detail the development and application of each federal
statute to the theft of trade secrets and confidential business information.
45 Furthermore, this tool will allow states that currently have some form of criminal law
protection to amend their outdated and ineffective statutes.
46See generally James Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177 (1997); Stanley S. Arkin & Michael F. Colosi, The Criminalization of
Theft of Technology and Trade Secrets, 3 No. 5 BUs. CRIMEs BULL. 4 (1996). One distinct and
limited federal statute provides criminal sanctions for the unauthorized disclosure of
government information by a government employee. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1994). While this
statute does explicitly cover trade secrets, the usefulness of this statute is limited in two
regards. First, the statute specifically covers only government employees who disclose or
misappropriate only government information. Id. Therefore, this statute does not apply to
private individuals, corporations, or foreign governments. Id. In addition to the limited
scope, the statute only provides for misdemeanor criminal sanctions and is seldom used for
prosecution purposes. Pooley, supra note 46, at 229. In fact, only one appellate decision has
been reported under this statute. See United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d 573 (5th. Cir.
1989) (upholding a conviction for running background checks whom a friend of the
defendant suspected of drug dealing).
- 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994). See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
-18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994). See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
50 Pooley, supra note 46, at 177. Generally all three statutes prohibit the theft and
misappropriation of property. Toren, supra note 15, at 64. Case law recognizes that under
certain circumstances these federal statutes may encompass the theft of trade secrets and
confidential business information. Id. See infra notes 52-94 and accompanying text for a
detailed examination and analysis of each federal statute and case law interpreting the
statutes to cases involving theft of trade secrets and proprietary business information.
5118 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West 1996). See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
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B. The Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act: 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(ITSA)
The first of these statutes, the ITSA, was enacted in 1934 pursuant to
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, with the goal of aiding states
in the detection and punishment of criminal activity.52 Under this statute
the government is required to prove two preliminary elements to obtain
a conviction. 53 First, the government must prove that the trade secrets
were transported in interstate or foreign commerce.54 Second, the
government must prove that the defendant knew that the information
was stolen, converted or taken by fraud s s Next, the government must
also show that the value of the trade secret exceeds five thousand
dollars. 56 Finally, to obtain a conviction, the government must prove that
the trade secret or confidential business information constitutes a "good,
ware, or merchandise," a requirement under the language of the
statute.5 7
52 Toren, supra note 15, at 68. As Toren explains, the statute specifically addressed the
growing problem of criminals evading state authorities by fleeing across state lines with
stolen property. Id. As the title of the act illustrates, its application is limited to
transportation in interstate commerce and does not apply to intrastate misappropriation
and theft. Id. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the
value of $5000 or more, knowing the same have been stolen, converted
or taken by fraud.. .shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than [a number of years], or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
53Toren, supra note 15, at 68.
541d.
55 Id. These two inquiries generally do not provide any difficult legal questions. Id.
56 Toren, supra note 15, at 81. This requirement is not always easy to establish for two
reasons. Id. at 82. First, the market value of a trade secret is frequently not ascertainable.
Id. Second, trade secrets are often stolen at a developmental stage when the information
has never been sold or marketed. Id. No uniform approach has developed, but courts have
developed three common methods for determining value. Id. at 84. One method employed
takes into consideration the costs to develop the trade secret. See United States v. Stegora,
849 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1988). Another method considers the market in which the trade
secrets change hands among thieves. See United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.
1960). Finally, the company who developed the trade secret can show the potential
revenues or profits that would be generated by the product, service, or process. See United
States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973). See
generally Toren, supra note 15, at 84.
5 18 U.S.C. 2314 (1994). See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
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The theft of a tangible trade secret triggers the statute.s 8
Furthermore, if an intangible trade secret is embodied in a tangible item
that is stolen, the statute is also triggered.59 However, the main
drawback to the application of this statute to the theft of trade secrets is
illustrated by its treatment of purely intangible property. 6° In particular,
the decision in United States v. Brown61 casts doubts on whether the
58 United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959). In Seagraves, the defendant
purchased numerous Gulf Oil Corporation geophysical and geological maps (revealing the
potential locations for productive oil wells) from an employee of the company who had
stolen the maps. Id. at 878. The court held that the maps fell under the language "goods,
wares and merchandise" of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Id. at 880. The court reasoned that the maps
involved were frequently sold, possessed significant value, and the information was not
generally known; therefore, they classified the maps as a trade secret. Id. See also United
States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that interstate sales of pirated
videotape cassettes violates 18 U.S.C. § 2314). These cases demonstrate that the theft of a
physical object containing the actual trade secret or confidential information will qualify for
prosecution under this act. Pooley, supra note 46, at 184.
59 United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966). In Bottone, the defendant
temporarily removed and copied confidential documents detailing a laboratory
manufacturing process. Id. at 391. The defendant argued that photocopies, microfilms, and
notes did not constitute "goods, wares or merchandise," under the statute as the tangible
product was not actually stolen. Id. at 393. The court held that stolen intangible
information embodied and transported in a different physical object fell under the
language of "goods, wares or merchandise." Id. The court reasoned that the subject matter
and substance of the information should be protected, whether or not the physical form of
the stolen tangible object was possessed by the original owner. Id. at 394. The court left
open for question the possibility that the statute might not be triggered if no tangible
objects were taken. For example, a secret formula could be memorized or carried away in
the recesses of a thievish mind and placed in writing at a subsequent time. Id. at 393. The
problem of protecting purely intangible secrets under this statute has conflicting results.
See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text. However, other courts have followed Bottone
and found that when the physical form of stolen goods is secondary in every respect to the
matter recorded in them, transformation of information in stolen papers to an intangible
object never possessed by the original owner is covered by the statute. See, e.g., United
States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973) (holding
that stolen copies of documents containing manufacturing formulations of chemical
products transported in interstate commerce constituted goods, wares, and merchandise
under 18 U.S.C. § 2341).
Intangibles are often defined as "property.. .lacking physical existence". BLAcK'S LAW
DICIONARY 558 (6th ed. 1991). As trade secrets often constitute purely intangible property
or quasi-intangible property, this is extremely problematic and signifies the main weakness
with using this statute to prosecute the theft of trade secrets. Pooley, supra note 46, at 180.
The ITSA was drafted at a time when information could not be quickly copied and
instantaneously transmitted to any location in the world. Id. Furthermore, intangible
information currently plays a much greater significance to individual companies in the
micro, and the economy as a whole in the macro, than it did when the ITSA was
promulgated. Id. See supra notes 15-16 discussing the intangible nature of trade secrets and
proprietary information.
61 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991).
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phrase, "goods, wares, and merchandise" contained in the statute covers
intangible property.62 The defendant in Brown worked as a computer
programmer for The Software Link, Inc. (TSL).63 The company
suspected Brown of theft of computer programs and source code.64 After
an FBI investigation produced evidence that the defendant had stolen
the source code to a TSL product, the defendant was indicted pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2314.6 However, the court determined that purely
intangible property cannot constitute "goods, wares or merchandise"
within the meaning of the statute." The court reasoned that under
62 The key question arises as to whether the phrase "goods, wares or merchandise" in the
statute requires a strict application by the courts to theft of only tangible items. See supra
notes 58-60 and accompanying text. One federal district court has refused to read a
tangibility requirement into the statute. United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill.
1990). In Riggs two defendants developed a scheme to steal Bell South's computer text file
which contained information regarding its enhanced 911 (E911) system for handling
emergency calls. Id. at 417. The text file detailed the procedures for installation, operation,
and maintenance of E911 services. Id. Bell South considered this computer file to contain
valuable proprietary information and closely guarded the information from public
disclosure. Id. The defendants stole this information through the transmission of electronic
impulses from the Bell South computer to the defendant's computer. Id. at 420. The
defendant argued that the proprietary information contained in the computer text file did
not constitute a "good, ware or merchandise" within the purview of the statute. Id. The
defendant argued that no tangible objects were stolen from Bell South, thereby
distinguishing cases where intangible information was embodied in tangible objects and
then stolen. Id. at 421. See supra note 58 and accompanying text discussing cases involving
this theory. The court held that tangibility is not a requirement to meet the "goods, wares
or merchandise" test of 18 U.S.C. § 2341. Id. The court reasoned that although the
information is stored inside a computer and is therefore purely intangible, the information
is in a transferable, accessible, and salable form. Id. The court further reasoned that
reading a tangibility requirement into the definition of "goods, wares or merchandise"
would unduly restrict the scope of § 2314, especially in this modem technological age. Id.
The court stressed the notion that prior cases have liberally construed the terms in the
statute to designate property which is ordinarily the subject of commerce. Id. However, a
federal appeals court in United States v. Brown explicitly rejected the reasoning of Riggs and
held that a tangibility requirement must be present for successful prosecution under § 2314
Brown, 925 F.2d at 1308-9. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
63 Brown, 925 F.2d at 1302. One asset of TSL was a computer program which allowed IBM
"compatible computers to perform complex activities such as multi-tasking and sharing of
data among multiple users." Id. at 1302 n.2.
64 Id. at 1303. Source code is frequently referred to as the "assembly language" in which
programmers write the computer programs. Id. at 1303 n.4. The code is then translated
into machine language and incorporated into the computer system. Id. The defendant
eventually became the subject of an FBI investigation which culminated in the issuance and
execution of a search warrant. Id. at 1302.
65 Id. at 1303.
6Brown, 925 F.2d at 1309. The court cited with approval the notion that if intangible
property can be represented physically or in a tangible medium (such as photocopying or
writing the information on a piece of paper), then the object qualifies as a good, ware or
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Dowling v. United States67 the element of physical tangibility in the stolen
item is required for a trade secret to be covered under the "goods, wares,
or merchandise" language in section 2314.68  Therefore, the court
explicitly required that for information to constitute a "good, wares or
merchandise" under the statute, the information must be embodied in a
tangible object or medium.69 In an increasingly electronic environment,
where a thief can transmit stolen trade secrets without misappropriating
any tangible property owned by the victim, the viability of section 2314
is seriously in question.70 In cases where no tangible property is stolen,
merchandise. See supra note 59. Also, a tangible item qualifies for application of § 2314.
Brown, 925 F.2d at 1308-1309. See supra note 58. However, the court distinguished this case
from the prior cases as they involved situations where there existed a physical identity
between the intangible item and the unlawfully obtained and transported tangible object.
Brown, 925 F.2d at 1307-1309. In this case, the prosecution could not prove physical theft or
transportation of any physical property belonging to TSL. Id.
6 473 U.S. 207 (1985). The Supreme Court in Dowling was confronted with a prosecution
for interstate distribution of bootlegged Elvis Presley records in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2314 (1994). Id. at 209. While the case involved copyright infringement, the court set forth
critical language in the context of trade secret protection under the ITSA. The Court stated
that prosecution under ISA required a "physical identity between the items unlawfully
obtained and those ... transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject
goods." Id. at 216. This language allowed the Brown court to hold that purely intangible
property, such as the source code discussed in supra note 64 is not covered under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (1994). Brown, 925 F.2d at 1307.
68 Brown, 925 F.2d at 1309. The court stated that "The computer program itself is an
intangible intellectual property, and as such, it alone cannot constitute goods, wares,
merchandise.. .within the meaning of §§ 2-314 or 2-315." Id. On the surface other courts
have reached different outcomes. See United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir.
1959); United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960). However, these cases are easily
distinguished in that the stolen intangible item was represented in a tangible object that
was transported in interstate commerce. Toren, supra note 15, at 76. Therefore, Brown
remains as the only case involving theft of purely intangible property prosecuted under the
ITSA. Id. at 81. Furthermore, a recent 7th Circuit case affirmatively states that "we are not
aware of any case applying any portion of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 to something completely
intangible." United States v. Kenngott, 840 F.2d 375,380 (7th Cir. 1987).
69 Id. See also United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973); Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1%7); United States v. Seagraves, 265
F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Kenngott, 840 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.
1966). Most importantly the language in United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) clearly
contemplates a physical connection or physical taking of a tangible object. Toren, supra
note 15, at 81. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
70 Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 185. This illustrates the first problem with the ITSA,
limited scope. See supra notes 15-16, discussing the primary feature of trade secrets and
proprietary business information as encompassing intangible aspects. Another problem
with this interpretation of the statute is that is treats two defendants (both who
misappropriated the same trade secret) differently depending on the mode of theft. Pooley
et al., supra note 46, at 185. If the defendant steals the information by copying it and storing
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prosecutors could no longer invoke section 2314.71 Therefore, the
decision in Brown severely limits any prosecution for theft of trade
secrets via computer technology.72 Also this decision could potentially
be applied to many other sophisticated methods of electronic theft such
as wireless microphones and electronic surveillance equipment where
nothing tangible is removed from the company. 73
Furthermore, the language of United States v. Dowlingn4 and United
States v. Brown7s is likely to have an adverse impact on the decision by
the government as to whether to prosecute a case using this statute.76
For these reasons, the impact of The Interstate Transportation of Stolen
Property Act on deterring the misappropriation and theft of trade secrets
and confidential business information is relatively minimal.7' Other
it in a tangible medium, such as a computer disk, the statute applies. Id. at 184-85. If the
thief follows the method of the defendant in Brown and transfers the information to another
intangible medium, the statute arguably is not triggered. Id. These "short-comings" reveal
the reasons for congressional decision to enact the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Id. at
185. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
71 Id. Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 185.
n Id.
73Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
74 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
- 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991).
76 Toren, supra note 15, at 81. Toren argues that the importance of these cases calls for an
amendment to this statute to specifically include interstate transportation of stolen
intangible property. Id. However, the passage of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
discussed in infra notes 98-120, eliminates the need for any change to this statute.
77 The problem is two-fold. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6 (1996). First, the statute deals
specifically with crimes involving traditional goods, wares and merchandise. Id. And for
this purpose, the statute has served its purpose extremely well. Id. However, this statute is
not well suited to deal with situations involving "intellectual property" and intangible
property. H.RL REP. No. 104-788, at 10 (1996). As witnessed by the language of Dowling
and Brown, discussed in supra notes 62-75, the trend of the courts in interpreting this statute
to trade secrets and business information has failed to find that this type of property is
covered under the ITSA. The current case law, therefore, limits the usefulness of
prosecution under this statute. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6 (1996). Second, the statute was
drafted at a time when no one contemplated the widespread use of computers and copy
machines as a means of transferring information. Id. This is a corollary limitation similar
to the lack of scope. Information can be wrongfully duplicated and transmitted
electronically creating an intangible theft that would not be covered under this statute. Id.
The goal and provisions of this statute were not meant to cover trade secrets and business
information. Id. See supra notes 62-78 for discussion of the narrow scope problem, and
supra note 52 for a discussion of the nature of the purpose and goal of this statute, detailing
the lack of intent for coverage of trade secrets under this statute.
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federal statutory approaches have encountered the same inherent
difficulties as those witnessed by this statute.78
C. Federal Mail and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1341 & 18 U.S.C. § 1343
The federal Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud statutes generally proscribe
any scheme devised to obtain property by false or fraudulent means.79
In one regard, convictions are easier to obtain under these statutes than
The Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Acto because of the
78 Most notably all federal statutory law prior to the passage of the EEA was not directly
aimed at the protection of trade secrets and proprietary business information. H.R. REP.
No. 104-788, at 12 (1996). As discussed supra note 52, the ITSA had a stated purpose of
deterring transportation of stolen goods. As discussed in infra notes 83-84, both mail and
wire fraud are limited by the mode of transportation. Therefore, when looking at the prior
federal statutory scheme to prosecute theft of trade secrets (before the EEA), each statute
suffers from different limitations which severely curtail any significant attempts at
successful prosecution. The problem arises by trying to manipulate and extend the
language and meaning of statutes that were never meant to address the specific problem at
issue. As a result, prosecutors have had trouble "shoe-homing" economic espionage cases
into these laws. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 7 (1996). The EEA was promulgated to directly
address the issue of theft and misappropriation of trade secrets. See infra notes 95-97
detailing the legislative history and purpose of the EEA.
"18 U.S.C. § 1341, provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose
of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or
procure... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice... places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
deposits or causes to be deposited any... thing ... to be sent or delivered
by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail or such carrier.. .shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes
to be transmitted by means of wire, radio or television communication
in interstate or foreign commerce...shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994). Both statutes raise the penalty to not more than 30 years
imprisonment and a one million dollar fine if the violation affects a financial institution. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. (1994)
- 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
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expansive language used in the statutes. 81 The broad reach of these
statutes as applied to trade secrets and proprietary business information
is illustrated by Carpenter v. United States.82 In Carpenter, the Supreme
Court held that an employee's use of the confidential information
generated by his employer violated both section 1341 and section 1343.8
The Court specifically recognized that the unlawful use of the Wall Street
Journal's confidential business information is within the reach of both
federal Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud statutes.84 Furthermore, the Court
found that although the nature of WSJ property right was intangible, the
scope of protection under both statutes is not limited only to tangible
property rights.85 However, the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes
81 Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 185. The broader scope results from distinguishing the
narrower phrase "goods, wares, and merchandise" as used in § 2314 and the term
"property" used in sections 1341 and 1343. Id. As discussed in supra notes 60-72, intangible
information has difficulty falling under the language of "goods, wares and merchandise"
of § 2314. However, courts have repeatedly found that the term "property" encompasses
intangible property. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978). In Seidlitz the
defendant was prosecuted for transmitting computer information from a company called
OSI via the telephone. Id. at 155. The court deemed the intangible information a property
right possessed by OSI. Id. at 160. The court reasoned that the company invested massive
sums of money to develop and modify the system and enjoyed a huge competitive
advantage as a result of these efforts. Id. The court further guaranteed protected status
because the property was not in the public domain. Id. The situation is nearly identical to
the prosecution of the defendant in Brown. Brown, 925 F.2d at 1301. However, the court
interpreting Brown failed to allow protection for intangible property under § 2314. Id. In
this case, the broader term "property" allows prosecutions that may escape § 2314 through
the use of mail and wire fraud statutes. Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 185.
82484 U.S. 19 (1987).
83 The defendant was an author of an advice column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ).
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19. The defendant entered into a scheme with stockbrokers to
exchange confidential information in the column in advance of publication. Id. In return,
the defendant would receive a portion of the profits. Id. The advice column written by the
defendant had a qualitative impact on the market prices of the stocks it discussed because
of its perceived quality and integrity. !d. On the basis of this scheme, the defendants were
convicted of violating insider trading laws. Id. More importantly to this discussion, the
court upheld their convictions based on 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Id.
94 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19. The court acknowledged that the WSJ had a "property right in
keeping confidential and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the.. .contents of the
column." /d. Therefore, the Supreme Court has afforded protection under these statutes to
confidential business information and trade secrets. Id.
8s The defendants attempted to assert that their activities were not a scheme to defraud the
WSJ within the meaning of the statute, because the rights asserted by the WSJ are
intangible rights and therefore outside of the scope of the statutes. Id. at 25. The court
explicitly rejected this assertion. Id. The Court found that the event which defrauded WSJ
was not selling the information to a competitor. Id. The fraud involved was that the WSJ
was deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information. Id. at 26. The business has a
right to decide how to use the information prior to publication, and the defendant's
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critically suffer from one weakness: trade secret theft generally does not
involve the use of interstate mail or wire.86 Therefore, although these
statutes have a broader scope, they do not adequately address the
problems demonstrated by the most common and prevalent types of
corporate and economic espionage.87
Prior federal law in the area of the theft and misappropriation of
trade secrets and proprietary business information provides no useful
statutory deterrent.88 The ITSA suffers from an extremely limited scope
in the type of information protected.89 This statute never contemplated
the massive importance and widespread use of purely intangible
information in the current global economy.90 The federal Mail and Wire
interference with that right, whether intangible or not, does not make the information any
less protected. Id. at 25.
86 Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 186. Furthermore, as illustrated by the Carpenter decision,
the prosecution must also establish an intent to defraud on the part of the defendants.
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19.
87 See infra notes 88-92. An easy way to avoid prosecution is not to transmit the information
through the mail or by wire. The quickest way to transmit the information remains by
meeting face to face. The thief and potential purchaser of the information can personally
meet, discuss the terms of the deal, and transfer the stolen information without any threat
of prosecution under these statutes. While the broader scope helps alleviate the problem
under the MTSA, the limitation on the mode of transmittal of the information curtails any
meaningful deterrent threat under these statutes.
88 Although Congress has enacted both patent and copyright protection, no federal law
prior to the EEA protected proprietary economic information from theft and
misappropriation in a systematic and principled manner. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6-7 (1996).
See supra notes 15-17 for a discussion of the value of proprietary economic information to
the lifeblood of U.S. corporations and the economy. See infra notes 98-120 for a discussion
of the EEA, discussing the improvements and advantages made by this statute to the
protection of trade secrets through criminal penalties, but also detailing the many inherent
and external limitations present in this statute.89 See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
o As discussed, intangible assets have become critically important to the prosperity of
companies. See supra note 15-16. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996). To demonstrate
this point, in 1982 tangible assets (machinery, equipment, buildings, land) accounted for
62% of the market value of mining and manufacturing companies. Id. By 1992, they
represented only 38% of the market value. Id. This survey is interesting in two regards.
First, the data illustrates the shifting nature of the asset base. This illuminates that in the
future, growth and stability comes not from advancements and augmentation to the
tangible asset base, but to achieving economic growth and value through the exploitation
of intangible assets. This exploitation is accomplished by keeping the information
confidential and secret. Second, intangible assets are less prevalent in manufacturing
companies relative to biotechnology companies and other "high-tech" industries. As the
nation moves into an economy based more on information and technology and less
dependent on manufacturing firms, the value and importance of intangible assets will only
continue to grow. Protection of these valuable rights requires principled, independent,
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Fraud Statutes fail to adequately deter theft and misappropriation by
severely limiting the modes of transfer that trigger prosecution.91 This
statute was not designed to combat the highly sophisticated methods
currently available for stealing trade secrets and business information. 2
The patchwork nature of these statutes detailing protection against the
theft and misappropriation of trade secrets and business information,
combined with the indirect nature of criminal prosecution under these
laws, led Congress to directly address the problem with acclaimed
legislation in 1996.93
Congressional hearings prior to enactment of the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 amply document the two major underpinnings of
the legislation.94 First, foreign powers, through a variety of means, are
actively involved in stealing critical technologies, data and information
from U.S. companies for the economic benefit of their own industrial
sector.95  Second, laws on the books, including the Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property Act and the Mail Fraud and Wire
Fraud statutes were of virtually no use in prosecuting acts of economic
espionage.% Therefore, Congress responded to these dual concerns by
passing The Economic Espionage Act of 1996.9
powerful, and systematic statutory protection through both federal criminal law and state
criminal and civil law.
91 The act has proved limited in use mainly because the statute requires proof that the mail
system or wire system are used in commission of the act. H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 10
(1996). See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 19. The majority of theft and misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential business information fails to involve mail or wire transfers. See supra note 87.
9 3 As President Clinton succinctly stated in signing the EEA into law, "Until today, federal
law has not accorded appropriate or adequate protection to trade secrets. Law
enforcement officials relied.. .on antiquated laws that have not kept pace with the
technological advances of modem society." Statement of the President of the United States,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034 (Oct. 11, 1996). See infra notes 98-120 discussing the EEA, its
purpose, scope, penalties and deterrence effect.
94 Mossinghoff, supra note 33, at 191.
95 Id. at 193. Robert Gates, former director of the CIA states before Congress, "Many foreign
intelligence services are shifting the emphasis in targeting to...economic information and
technology as opposed to military information." S. REP. No. 104-359, at 5 (1996). One
author has written an entire book on the subject of foreign espionage of U.S. companies'
proprietary economic, business and technological information. FIALKA, supra note 12. See
also supra note 12 discussing foreign government sponsorship of economic espionage. Not
only are foreign governments responsible for theft of trade secrets and confidential
business information, U.S. corporations are also to blame. See supra notes 12-13.
% Mossinghoff, supra note 33, at 193.
-18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West 1996).
Ruhl: Corporate and Economic Espionage: A Model Penal Approach for Lega
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999
782 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
D. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA)
The EEA provides an extremely comprehensive definition of what
constitutes a trade secret.98 The definition generally tracks the definition
of trade secrecy in the UTSA. 99 However, the language of the EEA is
different in three important aspects. 100 First, the EEA expands the list of
potential types of trade secrets and confidential business information. 101
Second, the EEA extends the definition of trade secrets to include both
tangible and intangible information.10 2 Third, the EEA enlarges the
98 The term "trade secret" means:
All forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled,
or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if:
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret, and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by the public.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West 1996). At the outset, this definition incorporates three extremely
important concepts not covered by prior federal law. The definition specifically recognizes
intangible property as a protected trade secret. Id. Second, the statute addresses the
problem of thieves memorizing the information and transmitting that information at a
subsequent time in the future. /d. Third, the economic value can be demonstrated by a
showing that keeping the information secret could produce value in the future, i.e. the
confidential information has a potential value, although not currently realized. Id.
99 Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 188. See supra note 22 for the UTSA definition. However,
the JTSA provides for remedies in civil litigation as opposed to criminal sanctions. The
EEA definition is the first federal criminal statute to directly address the concerns of trade
secret protection through a proactive deterrent, as opposed to a reactive remedy. See supra
notes 94-98.
100 Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 189.
1m Id. As representative of this expansion, section 1839 explicitly includes "financial,
business [or] economic.. .information.... Id. Furthermore, section 1839 includes
"plans.. .methods... processes, [and] programs...." Id. The language appears to be
deliberately broad, to effectuate the legislative purpose and goal of providing a
"comprehensive approach". S. REP. No. 104-359 at 7 (1996).
102 The language explicitly encompasses information in any form "whether tangible or
intangible." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West 1996). The importance of this language cannot be
understated. The statute protects information in tangible objects and intangible
information embodied in tangible objects (photocopying a supplier list from a computer
screen). This is no great breakthrough, for, the court decisions under the ITSA covered this
type of theft. See supra notes 58-60. However, the EEA covers information "stored in an
individual's head." Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 189. Memorizing a trade secret equates
to misappropriating a trade secret. Id. In theory, this would be somewhat difficult for the
prosecution to prove, however; many civil suits have been successful under this theory. See
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prohibited conduct with a comprehensive definition of
misappropriation. 10 3
The EEA criminalizes both economic espionage by foreign entities °4
and the theft of trade secrets by domestic entities.105 The provisions of
Stampede Tool Warehouse Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209 (I1. App. Ct. 1995) (suit arising out
of an employee memorizing customer lists).
10 The act covers theft through obvious physical methods, such as "tak[ing], carry[ing]
away, or conceal[ing]...." 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831, 1832 (West Supp. 1998). However, the act
also defines misappropriation to include less conspicuous (and more difficult to detect)
methods, such as "download[ing], upload[ing], destroy[ing] ... replicat[ing]...
communicat[ing]." 1d. This definition closely follows to the UTSA. Again, the striking
difference is in the approach. The EEA provides criminal sanctions, whereas the UTSA
provides civil remedies. See supra notes 24-33.
104 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent,
knowingly:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away,
or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys
a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret; knowing the same to
have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more persons to commit any offense
described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall,
except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000
or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Organizations: Any organization that commits any offense
described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10,000,000.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 1996).
Section 1839 defines the term "foreign instrumentality":
Any agency, bureau, ministry, component, institution, association, or
any legal, commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm or
entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored commanded,
managed, or dominated by a foreign government.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West 1996).
The term "foreign agent" means any officer, employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or
representative of a foreign government. Id.
1- 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or
foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the
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this statute reprimand both illegal and immoral business conduct.1°6 The
penalty provisions under both section 1831 and section 1832 treat
violations as a serious crime.1°7 In addition, the territorial reach of the
owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure
any owner of that trade secret, knowingly:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away,
or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such
information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys
such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information; knowing the same to
have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3); or (5) conspires with one or more persons to commit any
offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall,
except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection
(a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (West 1996).
106 Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 193. The terms might also encompass some lawful
business competitive intelligence practices. Pooley theorizes that the EEA may prohibit
"reverse engineering". Id. at 194. Reverse engineering involves obtaining a competitor's
product and disassembling the product to discover the properties and characteristics. Id.
Individuals and corporations may become liable under the language in the act regarding
"altering of a trade secret" or "sketching or drawing" of a product or process that qualifies
as a trade secret. Id. However, the most common type of reverse engineering, looking at or
testing of a lawfully obtained marketed commercial product to determine its content, will
not be illegal under the EEA. Id. Furthermore, it is not likely that companies would choose
to pursue a garden-variety action of reverse engineering for two reasons. First, almost all
companies perform some type of reverse engineering. By fostering an environment of
litigation, the company is itself potentially liable. Second, most companies would not
prefer to generate animosity through litigation realizing that today's competitors may
become tomorrow's partners.
"" Section 1832 provides for up to a ten year imprisonment and an undetermined fine for
individuals while permitting fines up to five million dollars for corporations and
organizations. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (West Supp. 1998). Furthermore, section 1831 provides
heightened penalties for cases of foreign espionage by raising the maximum imprisonment
to fifteen years and setting the maximum fine for organizations at ten million dollars. 18
U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 1996). In addition, Section 1834 provides for the forfeiture of a
defendant's property during sentencing-
the court.. .shall order.. .that the person forfeit.. .any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation and.. property used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate
the commission of such violation.
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statute is extremely broad.108 For these reasons, the EEA is the first
federal criminal statute that has the potential to be an extremely potent
method for deterring and punishing the theft of corporate trade secrets
and proprietary business information.1°9
However, a federal government approach under this statute is
unlikely to protect the majority of businesses facing the rising problem of
corporate espionage for four important reasons. First, the main target of
this particular federal law is aimed at reducing the involvement of
foreign countries in targeting U.S. industries in efforts to obtain their
proprietary business information and trade secrets.1 0 Therefore, it is
unlikely that the federal government will expend huge amounts of time,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1834 (West Supp. 1998).
108 Pooley et.al., supra note 46, at 204. The act applies to activity conducted within the
United States, but also to foreign activity, provided that any act "in furtherance of the
offense was committed in the United States." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837). Considering
that curbing foreign espionage was one primary goal behind the implementation of this
law, a broad grant of jurisdictional power is needed to achieve that goal. Pooley et.al.,
supra note 46, at 204. The limitation of resources in terms of time and money combined
with foreign policy considerations also inherently limits the government to prosecute only
cases with a showing of considerable national interest. Id. See infra note 111.
109 The strong points of this act are numerous. First, the EEA provides comprehensive
scope and coverage through a broad definition of trade secret and confidential information.
See supra notes 98-102. Second, the modes of theft and misappropriation covered are
expansive and sweeping. See supra note 103. Third, the penalty provisions provide a
powerful criminal deterrent. See supra note 107. Fourth, the EEA extends protection to
theft and misappropriation by domestic and foreign instrumentalities. See supra note 108.
This is a double-edged sword however, as the focus will primarily be on the illegal actions
of foreign actors. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. Upon signing the bill,
President Clinton explained the overall significance of the EEA, "This act establishes a
comprehensive and systematic approach to trade secret theft and economic espionage,
facilitating investigations and prosecutions." Statement of the President of the United
States, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034 (Oct. 11, 1996). While the EEA was certainly an important
first step in the addressing of this problem, the act will likely be more symbolic and
figurative than used in prosecution by the U.S. government. See infra notes 110-20 and
accompanying text.
110 One author states that the "[a]ct was passed primarily to 'level the playing field' in the
international arena." Collins, supra note 34, at 15. The statute sends a clear and strong
"hands off" signal to outside entities. Id. The legislative history strengthens this argument.
"Our fundamental assessment is that while the end of the Cold War did not bring an end to
the foreign intelligence threat, it did change the nature of that threat." U.R. REP. No. 104-
788, at 7 (1996) ("The threat has become more diversified and complex."). Foreign
intelligence services, both private and government sponsored are recognizing that national
power is a function of economic power. Id. Because the United States is on the cutting
edge of technological innovation, U.S. corporations are a prime target. See supra notes 15-
16. While foreign economic espionage is a potentially massive problem that surely needs
addressing, domestic espionage is as significant and potentially more dangerous to the U.S.
economy.
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effort, and money to investigate and prosecute domestic crimes and
domestic criminal defendants.111  Second, the FBI and federal
government will focus their target most notably on wide spread, large-
scale, egregious economic espionage where the evidence is clear and
convincing.n 2 This leaves a tremendous gap in cases where the
espionage involves a relatively small activity in terms of monetary value
and effort expended.113
Third, criminal law in general suffers inherently from four
drawbacks that may decrease the motivation of corporations to enlist the
help of the federal government. 14 First, criminal statutes do not
adequately protect the rights of the victim.1 5 Second, prosecutors do not
have the expertise to prosecute high-tech crimes." 6 Third, the victim
relinquishes control of the case to the government." 7 Fourth, the burden
M1 This may represent sentiments that foreign corporations and governments acting
together create an unfair, and unrestricted power that U.S. corporations alone have
difficulty counteracting. In comparison to other foreign powers, the U.S. government does
not sponsor espionage activities. The federal government can remedy this inequity by
using its resources to go after foreign entities more vigorously than domestic espionage.
Furthermore, domestic espionage generally pits one equally match" company against
another equally matched company on a familiar playing field. A dual approach may be the
best way of combating the problem. The federal government pursues foreign players,
while state criminal law attacks domestic theft and misappropriation. See infra Section Ill.
112 Collins, supra note 110, at 14. The type of espionage the act was intended to thwart were
clear cut cases with "smoking gun" evidence. Id. The government will pursue the fairly
egregious cases rather than those "gray area" cases. Id. A number of factors delineate
which cases are ripe for prosecution by the federal government: (1) whether the
information was clearly a trade secret; (2) whether the information was technical or
scientific in nature; (3) evidence of criminal intent and conduct; (4) evidence of the
information's monetary value; (5) the availability of other remedies; (6) whether the
misappropriation was promptly reported. Pooley et al., supra note 46, at 211. Two factors
merit further brief discussion. As to number 6, the EEA fails to establish a statute of
limitations. How quickly the matter was reported to the authorities is further complicated
by the fact that many companies fail to discover the theft or are fearful of the consequences
in reporting that theft. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. As to number 5, the focus
of this Note theorizes that with powerful state law criminal approaches, the federal
government will be able to effectively target the "featured" enemies. If state law
adequately protects these rights, the federal government can invest more time and money
in catching the "big-fish," notably foreign entities without the burden falling on smaller
scale operations. See supra note 110.
113 The gap can be greatly closed by strong state criminal law. To date, state criminal law is
out-dated and inadequate. See infra notes 163-195 and accompanying text.
114 Toren, supra note 15, at n.3.
1 1 Id.
116 Id.
117 ld.
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of proof is higher in the criminal context than in civil litigation.118 A final
weakness is that procedural difficulties accompany this statute for a
period of time.119 Overlapping all of these weaknesses is the issue of
whether the federal government will vigorously defend the rights of
corporate America by enforcing the statute on the books.120 For these
reasons, state law will likely be the most effective avenue for a proactive
deterrent approach to preventing the theft and misappropriation of trade
secrets.
However, current state law is outdated, extremely narrow in scope,
and lacks stiff penalty provisions. An investigation into the state law
approaches will demonstrate that a new approach is necessary, using the
Model Penal Code as its vehicle.
118 Band et al., supra note 23, at 1. The government has the burden of proving each element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The most difficult aspect will likely be
proving the defendant had the criminal intent. Id. The government will likely prosecute
cases where overwhelming evidence of criminal intent exists. Id. This coincides with the
problems detailing the government's desire to prosecute egregious cases with "smoking
gun" evidence. See supra note 112.
119 For example, when deciding which cases to prosecute, the decision requires the
approval of numerous Justice Department officials all the way up the line to the Attorney
General, Janet Reno. Band et al., supra note 23, at 1. This is troublesome in a few regards.
First, the process is bound to get caught up in typical federal "red tape" which comes with
agency action. Id. Second, when companies realize the potential uphill battle that will
ensue just to investigative approval, most are likely to give up. Id.
120 The prior federal statutes, such as mail and wire fraud were rarely enforced or
prosecuted in the area of misappropriation and theft of trade secrets and business
proprietary information. Band et al., supra note 23, at 1. Witnessed by the lack of
enforcement based on prior statutory law, the concern remains whether federal words will
speak louder than its actions. Id. Prosecutions may have been limited in the past primarily
because inadequate statutes existed and awareness of the theft of this information has been
only recently discovered to be a widespread problem. Id. Both play a role to some extent,
but generally the federal government is less concerned with issues relating to white collar
and business related crime. Id. It is unlikely that this statute will prompt the federal
government to do an about face and to become involved in this area on a widespread basis.
Id. Furthermore, as witnessed by the savings and loans scandals and insider trading
debacle of the late 1980's, the federal government seems to address these issues in a
reactive way, similar to civil litigation remedies. Id. As evidence of this reactive approach
in the tree years since passage of the EEA, only one federal case has proceeded to trial.
Daniel Eisenberg, Eyeing the Competition, TIME, March 22, 1999, at 59. As Eisenberg states
discussing the impact of the EEA, "the good guys haven't had much luck yet." Id. at 58.
While the FBI has expended more effort and resources to investigate corporate espionage,
the EEA's success in terms of prosecutions and convictions remains negligible. Id.
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Ill. STATE CRIMINAL LAW APPROACHES TO THE THEFT AND
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS AND PROPRIETARY BUSINESS
INFORMATION
A. Introduction
Both federal statutory law and state statutory law play important
roles in formulating an effective criminal deterrent to the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential commercial
information. 121 While federal legislation only recently followed the trend
of implementing a more comprehensive protection of valuable
commercial information with the passage of the EEA,122 state criminal
law has protected trade secrets since the late 1960s.123 However, only
121 Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial Information, 38
EMORY L.J. 921 (1989). As witnessed by supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text, current
federal criminal law leaves large gaps in the protection of trade secrets and proprietary
business information. While the EEA remedies numerous limitations of prior federal law,
the EEA, as discussed in supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text, provides a federal
legislative approach to an inherent state law issue. Corporations and businesses are
governed by the laws of the state in which they incorporate. WiLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN
A. EiSENBERG, CORPORATIONS 125 (7th ed. 1995). Furthermore, the American general
business climate tends to prefer a federalistic theory of economic regulation, feeling more
comfortable with state supervision and control as opposed to federal government
interference in corporate affairs. Management of both small privately held corporations
and large publicly held corporations are more likely to report theft and misappropriation of
trade secrets to local authorities, as opposed to reporting to the federal government for
prosecution. See supra note 112. With local authorities, the company has a greater ability to
retain some control over the investigation and prosecution. Furthermore, companies have
a much easier procedural route to obtaining quick and effective prosecution using local
authorities and state law. See supra note 119. However, current state law in almost every
state fails to adequately protect corporations. See infra notes 163-195 and accompanying
text. With companies reluctant to utilize the current federal criminal law approach, state
law needs to furnish the companies with an effective alternative prosecution vehicle. See
infra Section IV.
122 See supra notes 98-120. Also, only recently did the federal judiciary contribute to
expanded scope by broadly construing federal statutory schemes. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19.
However, as illustrated the federal judiciary has limited the scope of protection by
narrowly construing other federal statutes. Broum, 925 F.2d at 1307. The patchwork nature
of federal legislation was rectified by passage of the EEA. See supra notes 98-120. However,
the EEA also fails to adequately protect businesses from the theft and misappropriation of
trade secrets and proprietary business information. See supra notes 110-120.
123 Lederman, supra note 121, at 935. The state law trend can be described in three stages.
In the 1960's both civil and criminal trade secret statutes were passed establishing
protection of commercial information for the first time. Id. at 997. The 1970's witnessed a
growth in the passage of computer related trade secret criminal laws. Id. These statutes
explicitly covered information residing in computers. Id. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502
(West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 931-939 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-1-4, 35-43-
2-3 (Bums Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 751.797-752.791 (West Supp. 1989);
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thirty states currently have criminal laws addressing the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential business
information 24 and the statutes vary widely as to scope, coverage and
prohibited modes of transfer.12s Before discussing the various state
approaches, it is useful to illustrate the aspects where the majority of the
states have found common ground.
State criminal statutory law converges with regard to two "fixed"
elements or prerequisites.126 First, almost all of the statutes dealing with
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 156.00-156.50 (McKinney 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-33.05
(Vernon 1989). The 1980's witnessed an expansion of trade secret protection through broad
interpretations of the various federal statutes, including the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes. Lederman, supra note 121, at 997-98. However, the judiciary also significantly
narrowed the scope of the ITSA. See supra notes 61-69. Furthermore, protection is limited
by the requirements of the statute. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. The
development of state criminal law in the past 20 years has not kept pace with the
widespread use and importance of trade secret and confidential information. The outdated
criminal, unfortunately, coincides with the ease and powerful incentive to steal trade
secrets and confidential information. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6-7 (1996). Over the past
twenty years, the majority of states have adopted civil remedies but only a few states have
adopted, modified, or updated new criminal statutes dealing explicitly with the theft of
trade secrets. Id. See infra notes 163-195. In addition, most state laws in this area punish
only by misdemeanors and are rarely used by prosecutors. Id. See infra note 194.
124 Twelve states have promulgated specific statutes directly covering the theft of trade
secrets. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-107 (Michie 1997); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 499C (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-408 (West 1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 812.081 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-13 (1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (West Supp. 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West Supp. 1998);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-90 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1997);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1998).
13 states take the approach of including the theft of trade secrets under criminal statutes
relating to crimes against property. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-124 (West 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 857 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 18-2402 (1997); 72 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/15-8 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-23(a)(9) (West 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17A, § 352(1)(F) (West 1983); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 340(h)(11) (1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.52(1) (West Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-75-1 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 637:2(I) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1 (West Supp. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.01 (Anderson 1997)UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401 (1995). Two states include trade
secret protection under larceny statutes. MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 266 § 30 (West Supp.
1998); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00, 155.30, 165.07 (McKinney 1979). Finally three states
address the matter via protection under statutes for computer crimes. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:73.1-2 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-45-1-11 (1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-
501, 3-502 (Michie 1997). This leaves 24 states with absolutely no statutory protection
under current law.
12s See infra notes 164-175 and accompanying text.
126 Lederman, supra note 121, at 943. Secrecy and economic value "constitute the
prerequisites that delineate the boundaries of.. .confidential commercial information
protection." Id. at 936. Once inside those boundaries, however, each state takes a different
approach. See infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
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the theft of trade secrets and confidential business information require
the preservation of secrecy as a prerequisite for qualification under the
statute.127 A second prerequisite exists as to the issue of economic value
of the information or trade secret. 12s The two prerequisites, secrecy and
127 Lederman, supra note 121, at 938. Most of the statutes determine the conditions for the
establishment of secrecy status. Id. Many states require that the steps and effort the
possessor takes to protect the information be "reasonable under the circumstances." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2001(4)(b) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (1) (6)(ii) (West
Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1732 (West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
134.90(1)(c )(2), 943.205(2)(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). Courts have interpreted these
statutes to require that the possessor of the trade secret exercise active or affirmative
measures to guard the information's confidentiality. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley,
609 P.2d 733, 743 (Okla. 1980). Other states require specific proof that the information is
secret. Tennessee allows the information to qualify as a trade secret only when, "the owner
takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected
by the owner." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1997). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 499C
(West Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20 (West Supp. 1998). Many states have defined
secrecy and implemented tests. Once the possessor meets the requirements of the test, the
information is presumed to be a secret For example, secrecy under Pennsylvania law
requires that the owner identifies the information as confidential and that the information
has not been published or become a matter of general public interest. 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3930 (West Supp. 1998). After meeting this threshold test, Pennsylvania law states,
"There shall be a rebuttable presumption that scientific, technical.. .or confidential
information that has not been published or otherwise become a matter of general public
knowledge qualifies as a trade secret." Id. See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-408 (West
1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-45-1-11 (1994). While the language differs from state to state,
a keystone requirement throughout all of the states is that the information remains
confidential or secret, Lederman, supra note 121, at 938. The only exception to this
requirement occurs in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts statutory approach to protection
of trade secrets is covered under theft of property, and property is defined to include both
tangible and intangible objects. MASS. GEN. ANN. LAws ch. 266 § 30 (West Supp. 1998).
The Massachusetts language posits no requirement that the object remain confidential, or
obtain secrecy status to qualify for protection under the statute. Id.
128 Some states express this in terms that are extremely simplistic, the trade secret or
confidential information must be of "value" or "valuable." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-107
(Michie 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-408 (West 1990). Other states define property
as "anything of value" and explicitly include trade secrets in the definition. The language
from Indiana is representative of this approach, "Property means anything of value. The
term includes: trade secrets, intangibles, real property, personal property, money, labor
and services." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-23(a)(9) (West 1998). See also MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. LAW § 340(h)(11) (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401 (1995). Others follow the
UTSA definition that the "information must derive independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means." See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 857 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(1) (West
Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1998). Others have referred to the
concept that the trade secret must facilitate the gaining of competitive advantage. For
instance, Florida statutory language requires the information to be "of advantage to the
business, or providing an opportunity to obtain an advantage over those who do not know
or use it when the owner takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons
other than those selected by the owner." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081 (West Supp. 1999).
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economic value, are closely connected.129  Secrecy endows the
information with independent economic value.13" Conversely, having an
independent economic value justifies the protection of the information
under the statutes.131
However, state criminal statutory law widely diverges as to the
variable elements, including scope, coverage and prohibited modes of
transfer.132 Part B of this Section will provide an overview of state
criminal law approaches by grouping individual states into
representative models based on these variable elements.133 The overview
and discussion will provide a useful means for comparison between the
states and create a framework for part C of this Section, which will detail
Regardless of the terminology, the key issue is that the majority of the statutes posit a
requirement that the possessor affirmatively proe that the confidential information or
trade secret maintains some minimal level of economic value, whether it be real or
potential, present or in the future. Lederman, supra note 121, at 936. Only Massachusetts
abrogates this requirement. See MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 266 § 30 (West Supp. 1998).
129Lederman, supra note 121, at 936.
130Id.
131 Id.
132 Lederman, supra note 121, at 943. The variable elements (namely the information
content and proscribed modes of transfer) are critical to an effective analysis of current
state law approaches. Id. First, these elements shape the exact extent of the protection
under the law. Id. Second, they tend to dominate the subject matter's trend of
development. Id. Generally the content element consists of two groups of situations. Id.
The deliberate and restrained group limits the protection to scientific and technical
information. Id. at 943-44. The second group gradually extends the boundaries to
encompass other forms of confidential business information. Id. at 944. The element
regarding prohibited modes of transfer is categorized into four sets. Id.
[1] [P]rohibited modes... [are] limited solely to unauthorized corporeal
(physical, material) acquisition... [with] the information
being.. .undetached from the physical article containing it, [2]
[E]ncompasses, apart from corporeal acquisition, corporeal
transmission and transformation of information from one tangible
container or source to another... .[3] The other group... include[s]... the
two modes of corporeal transfer, incorporeal transmission or
transformation... [4] [R]etention of information in a totally incorporeal
(non-physical, non-material) mode.
Id. at 944.
After detailing two sets of content classifications and four sets of mode categorizations,
Lederman develops as the thesis for his Article, eight models that all states fall into. Id. at
945. However, my analysis will be less detailed and the states will be grouped into four
representative "models."
13 See infra notes 135-162
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the limitations and problems presented by the current state criminal law
approaches. 34
B. Overview of State Criminal Law Trade Secret Laws
Five state criminal statutes limit the prohibited mode of transfer to
strictly corporeal acquisition of the physical, tangible article containing
the trade secret.135 For example, Illinois characterizes theft as "obtaining
or exerting control over property of the owner" and limits that phrase to
physically "taking, carrying away, or conveying of possession of
property." 136 Two of these states further erode trade secret protection by
limiting the scope of coverage to strictly scientific and technical
material. 3 7 The other three states include within their trade secret
definition a more expansive scope including additional types of
commercial information. 13
Another cluster of states have strictly limited the content of
protection to include only scientific and technical information.139
13 See infra notes 163-195.
135 These statutes generally encompass activities that fall under traditional theft offenses.
Lederman, supra note 121, at 948. Therefore, none of these five states directly protect trade
secrets. Id. The statutes are drafted to protect property rights, and each state has defined
property differently. Id. See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
136 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-8 (West 1993). Maryland characterizes theft in an
identical manner, limiting the phrase "exerts control" to acts involving property which
"bring about a transfer of interest or possession, whether to the offender, or to another."
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAw § 340(g)(1) (1992). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-124
(West 1996); IDAHO CODE § 18-2402 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-75.1 (1997).
Lv For example, Connecticut limits the material covered to "a sample, culture,
specimen.. .record, recording or document...which constitutes or reflects a secret scientific
or technical process, invention, or formula." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-124 (West
1994). The language of the North Carolina statute is nearly identical to the Connecticut
version. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-75.1 (1997).
13 The other three states that fall under this model offer a more broad definition of
property. Maryland is representative of this approach and in addition to protecting
scientific information also includes under the definition of property "blueprints, financial
instruments and information, management information, merchandising and design
processes, and formulas." MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 340(i)(12) (1992). Both Idaho and
Illinois define property in a manner almost identical to the Maryland approach. See IDAHO
CODE § 18-2402 (1997); 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1 (West 1993).
m New York, for example, proscribes only the theft of "secret scientific information". N.Y.
PENAL LAw §§ 155.00, 155.30, 165.07 (McKinney 1997). However, the language is
somewhat more expansive than covering purely scientific matters, but also includes
records of a technical process, invention or formula. However, the language is in a purely
scientific context, limiting its application to purely business information. Other statutes
suffer from the same problems. Georgia and Tennessee have defined trade secrets to
include "the whole or any portion or phase of scientific or technical information, design,
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However, these state statutes have broadened the proscribed modes of
transfer.14°  The statutes provide greater protection by proscribing
unauthorized reproduction of a trade secret, but only to the extent that
the reproduction is embodied in a tangible item.141
The next wave of states provide an enhanced definition of the term
trade secret increasing the scope of coverage, while maintaining the
expanded list of proscribed modes of transfer. 142  In addition to
process, procedure, formula, or improvement which is secret and of value." GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-13(a)(4) (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138(a)(4)(1997). The statutes
recognize trade secrets, but suffer huge drawbacks because they narrowly define the terms,
limiting protection to only scientific or technical matters or information. These statutes
would not apply to the majority of business, financial, economic, marketing, or production
information. For companies focusing their products and services on scientific information,
such as pharmaceutical companies or bio-technology companies, these statutes would
likely cover much of their confidential information. However, for companies
manufacturing automobiles or computers or providing banking or financial services, these
statutes would be absolutely worthless.
140 New York prohibits the theft appropriation of tangible, physical substances, while also
expanding the proscribed mode of transfer to include the unauthorized making of "a
tangible reproduction or representation of such secret.. .material by means of writing,
photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording...." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 165.07 (McKinney 1999). In protecting the underlying information, this
statute constitutes the first step forward in protecting purely intangible information.
Georgia and Tennessee address this by proscribing copying of the article representing the
trade secret and defining the term "copy" to include "any facsimile, replica, photograph, or
other reproduction.. .and any note, drawing or sketch." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-13 (1996);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1997).
141 This solves the problem of the thief copying or transferring the information to another
tangible object and stealing only that object. However, these statutes would fail to extend
criminal penalties to a theft which occurs by memorization of the information for future
use or disclosure. Lederman, supra note 121, at 953. As long as a lapse of time exists
between the memorization of the original confidential material and its subsequent
reproduction or disclosure, no criminal liability arises. Id. The model followed by these
states prohibits only "tangible reproductions or representations" of the information or
material. Id. This model is a step forward from the previous statutes, but still fails to cover
all of the potential modes of transfer. See supra notes 135-136.
142 These states include other forms of confidential information while prohibiting the
unauthorized transmission and acquisition of tangible articles representing trade secrets.
Lederman, supra note 121, at 954. For example, Florida proscribes theft or embezzlement of
a trade secret and theft and embezzlement of an article "representing" a trade secret. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 812.081 (West Supp. 1999). Furthermore, Florida imposes criminal liability
on one "who causes to be made a copy of an article representing a trade secret." Id.
Florida defines the term copy as "any facsimile, replica, photograph or other
reproduction...." Id. Minnesota and Oklahoma sanction the copying of trade secrets and
the unlawful "representation of trade secrets." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(1) (West Supp.
1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (West Supp. 1999). Both statutes define
representation to include "depicting, recording, embodying, containing and constituting."
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protecting scientific and technical information, these state statutes
provide a definition of trade secrets that encompasses more general
business or commercial information. 43 While these statutes correctly
expand both content coverage and incorporate more modes of transfer,
the statutes still fail to cover the transmission of trade secrets or business
information via purely intangible means.144
The next significant move involves proscribing modes of transfer
apart from physical stealing and unlawfully duplicating the article in a
tangible medium.145 These statutes reach the incorporeal transmission of
trade secrets such as unauthorized disclosure, exposure, or
communication to another. 146 These models emphasize the abstract
nature of the protected substance, but also recognize that economic value
Id. These statutes gradually expand the modes of transfer to encompass reproduction of
trade secrets beyond mere copying or photographing. Id.
143 Lederman, supra note 121, at 955. These states include other forms of confidential
information while prohibiting the unauthorized transmission and acquisition of tangible
articles representing trade secrets. Id. at 954. Florida, Minnesota and Oklahoma represent
this approach. Florida defines trade secrets to include, "any compilation of information
which ... is used in the operation of a business ... including any list of suppliers, list of
customers, or business code." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081(1)(c) (West Supp. 1999).
Minnesota and Oklahoma expand trade secret status to "information, compilations,
method, technique, or process ... that derives independent economic value, actual or
potential from not being generally known." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(6)(i) (West Supp.
1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (West Supp. 1999). The language of these statutes
expands coverage by defining trade secret in a broad manner. No specific category of
information is covered so long as the company can show the information meets the
prerequisites of secrecy and independent economic value, the information qualifies under
the language of these statutes. Id. See supra notes 127-31.
14 The states that follow this model maintain the structural aspects evidenced by other
models. Lederman, supra note 121, at 953. This model prohibits the unauthorized
corporeal acquisition of the actual confidential information and any article which
represents the trade secret. Id. Furthermore, this model continues to sanction unpermitted
transmission of the information through copying and representing the information in any
tangible object. Id. However, these statutes do not completely cover the theft of trade
secrets. See infra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
14 Lederman, supra note 121, at 955.
146 Lederman, supra note 121, at 955. Pennsylvania proscribes not only reproducing the
trade secret but also the "exhibition of such article to another." 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3930 (West Supp. 1998). The prohibited modes of transfer in Wisconsin are extremely
similar. Wisconsin prohibits the exhibition, disclosure, and description of the secret
information. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1998). The importance of the
language under these statutes is that it extends prosecution to cases of breach of confidence
by a person to whom the trade secret was entrusted. Lederman, supra note 121, at 955-56.
However, the statutory language conditions criminal liability upon the performance of an
overt act. Id. at 956. The thief must exhibit some physical manifestation such as
communicating, disclosing, or unlawfully viewing the confidential information. Id.
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can be lost or diminished without actually damaging the physical
article.147 A group of states has taken this proposition further and
explicitly and unequivocaly recognized the theft of information in a
purely intangible form.148
These states address not only the incorporeal disclosure and
communication, but also incorporeal retention, memorization, and visual
retention of trade secrets.149  These statutes contain virtually no
restrictions regarding the banned modes of transferring confidential
business information and trade secrets. 50 The limitation in these statutes
concerns the content of the protected information.15 These statutes
147 Lederman, supra note 121, at 957. Prior statutes that prohibited copying or reproductioii
of the trade secret in a separate object symbolized the traditional idea of tangible
deprivation. Id. However, these statutes recognize the impairment to the owner of the
trade secret or confidential information by unauthorized communication or disclosure
produces as much damage as a tangible deprivation. Id. The rationale and perception of
these statutes represents an extremely important development in the criminal law
regarding theft of trade secrets. Id. The prohibition against unauthorized exhibition,
disclosure and communication of a trade secret completely disconnects the causation of
damage from the tangible deprivation of the article. Id. at 957. These states clearly
recognize that the damage accompanied by disclosure of the secret information to the
detriment of the owner and the consequential harm suffered from is more than mere theft
of a physical object. Id.
148 In addition to forbidding the unauthorized communication or transmission of a trade
secret, or copying the article representing the trade secret, Alabama and Texas have
included a general prohibition against stealing trade secrets by any means. ALA. CODE §
13A-8-10.4 (1994); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 1994). These provisions encompass
the physically carrying away of an article containing confidential information. Id.
Furthermore, the statutory language in these states is broad enough to explicitly and
unequivocally recognize theft of information through incorporeal retention, namely the
intentional unauthorized acquisition by listening or viewing of the information and
subsequent memorization. Lederman, supra note 121, at 958.
149 These statutes define the trade secret itself as the object of the theft. Lederman, supra
note 121, at 958. For example Texas defines stealing as "acquiring property by theft." TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 1994). Property, under the Texas statutes, includes any
tangible or intangible substance. Id. According to the Texas statute, one can steal
information in its intangible form, detached from the physical article containing it. Id. See
also Lederman, supra note 121, at 958. Statutory language in other states prohibits the
exercise of "unauthorized control" over trade secrets, with control construed to extend
beyond traditional modes of theft or larceny. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 352(1)(F)
(West 1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637:2(1) (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(i) (1995).
150 Lederman, supra note 121, at 961. Under this approach, the theft of information can
occur without an overt act, namely without leaving a "clear mark on reality," even to the
extent that the information holder is not aware of the offense. /d. From a practical
perspective, however, the commission of the crime will not be uncovered unless the thief
(after obtaining the information by listening, peeping, or memorizing) performs an overt
act such as selling or communicating the information. Id.
151 Lederman, supra note 121, at 961.
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narrowly define trade secrets, rarely covering any confidential business
or commercial information.152 Thus, only three states have criminal trade
secret statutes that adequately protect the interest of the trade secret
possessor.153
Colorado and Massachusetts have augmented protection by
combining the growth trends through expanding the scope of the
content protected under a definition of trade secrets' 4 while proscribing
the entire range and assortment of modes of transferring information.55
Furthermore, Delaware's combination of an expansive list of prohibited
152 Texas for example defines trade secrets as, "any scientific or technical information
design, process, procedure, formula, or improvement." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
31.05(a)(4) (West 1994). Alabama and Utah define trade secrets in a verbatim manner.
ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4(a)(4) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(i) (1995).
Is These states, of course, do not represent the business centers of America, like New York,
Los Angeles, or Chicago. The statutes in these three states are extremely comprehensive
and highly functional and while they protect companies within their states well, the use for
"foreign" business is inherently limited.
154 The confidential information in terms of content, embodies the various type of
information commonly used in commerce and industry. Lederman, supra note 121, at 962.
Colorado defines trade secrets as follows, "any scientific or technical information, design,
process, procedure or formula, improvement, confidential business, or financial
information.. .or other information relating to any business or profession." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-4-408(d) (West 1990). Massachusetts defines trade secrets to include "anything
tangible or intangible which represents secret merchandising, production or management
information, design, process, procedure or improvement. MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 266 §
30 (West Supp. 1998). Both statutes explicitly refer to secret business and commercial
information. Id.
15 The statutes cover all four modes: corporeal acquisition, incorporeal transmission
through disclosure, incorporeal retention of information in an intangible state, and copying
or reproducing the secret information to a separate tangible article. The Colorado statute
reads in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, with the intent to deprive or withhold from the
owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with the intent to
appropriate a trade secret to his own use or to the use of another,
steals, or discloses to an unauthorized person a trade secret, or,
without authority, makes or causes to be made a copy of an article
representing a trade secret, commits theft of a trade secret
(a) "article" means any object, material, device, or substance, or copy
thereof, including any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample,
specimen, prototype, model, photograph, microorganism, blueprint, or
map
(b) "copy" means any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other
reproduction of an article, and any note, drawing, sketch made of or
from an article
(c) "representing" means describing, depicting, containing,
constituting, reflecting, or recording.
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-408 (West 1990).
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modes of transfer, together with a sweeping list of protected property,
places it at the extensive end of the spectrum of comprehensive
protection of trade secrets and confidential business information through
state criminal law.156
Delaware has produced a criminal trade secret statute that protects
all confidential proprietary information by broadly defining the term
"trade secret."157 Delaware statutory language also encompasses all four
modes of theft and transmission of trade secrets and confidential
business information. 158  First, Delaware prohibits unauthorized
corporeal transmission or acquisition of tangible articles containing the
trade secret or confidential information.15 9 Second, Delaware prohibits
the unauthorized copying or reproduction of the trade secret or
confidential information in a separate tangible article.160 Third,
156 Lederman, supra note 121, at 964. The Delaware statutory approach is similar to
Colorado and Massachusetts, although the Delaware approach is of much more practical
importance to many American corporations. Over 40% of the firms listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) are incorporated in Delaware. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 121,
at 126. Both the statutory and common law of Delaware are aimed at attracting businesses
to incorporate in their state. /d. Providing "pro-business" statutory trade secret protection
may facilitate business incorporation within the state. It is no coincidence that Delaware
has the best statute on the books.
157 Lederman, supra note 121, at 964. Delaware language is read to cover any and all
confidential information of economic value and reads in pertinent part:
(4) Trade Secret shall mean information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique or process, that
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2001 (1995).
The broad Delaware language encompasses and protects all proprietary, confidential
information by including the information under the definition of trade secret. Also, the
statute poses no structural limitations by never including any term or phrase regarding
"scientific or technical information." Furthermore, the Delaware statute broadly defines
theft to include all three modes of transmission. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying
text.
158 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857 (1995).
W5 Theft is defined to include the physical deprivation or withholding of trade secrets by
another person permanently or for an extended period of time. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11 §
857(1995).
160 Any means of obtaining or exercising control over the trade secret, regardless of whether
the theft involved the original tangible object containing the trade secret or the theft
involved a separate article embodying the trade secret will trigger the statute. DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 11 § 857 (1995).
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Delaware prohibits the incorporeal transmission and acquisition of trade
secrets and confidential information through unauthorized exposure,
disclosure and communication. 161 Finally, Delaware recognizes theft of
trade secrets and confidential information in a purely intangible manner
by prohibiting transmission and acquisition through incorporeal
retention and memorization.162 Currently, only these three states afford
an adequate criminal law deterrent to the theft of trade secrets and
proprietary business information.
C. Limitations of Current State Criminal Law Approaches
An evaluation of the remaining twenty-seven state law approaches
to the protection of trade secrets and proprietary business information
through criminal law reveals numerous practical weaknesses. 16 First,
the majority of states lack an adequate definition of information
qualifying for protection as a trade secret or confidential business
information.164 The language in sixteen of the twenty-seven state
statutes explicitly confines itself to scientific or technical information.16
The language of these sixteen state statutes never directly or explicitly
covers confidential commercial, economic, or business information.166
This lack of breadth and depth in the definition and protection of trade
secrets leads to serious problems.167 In contrast, the EEA includes
161 Misappropriation is defined broadly to include any "acquisition of a trade secret by
improper means or disclosure or use of a trade secret without the consent of the owner."
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857 (1995). Acquisition can be in the form of exposure, disclosure,
or communication of the trade secret. Id.
162 The statute forbids the exercise of any unpermitted control, including incorporeal
retention over any type of economically valuable intangible confidential information. DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857 (1995).
16 See infra notes 164-195 and accompanying text.
I" Lederman, supra note 121, at 947-48.
165 Id. at 952-3. See supra notes 137,139,151-52 and accompanying text.
166 Lederman, supra note 121, at 952-53. A reading of the language of these statutes clearly
leads to the conclusion that the statute imposes criminal liability upon the theft of one
specific type of information, unrelated to any business related field. Id. The only theft
triggering these statutes involves stealing scientific or technical trade secrets or confidential
information. Id.
16 The applicability of these statutes is extremely limited to the majority of companies and
businesses operating in the United States currently. Most notably the language would not
cover the operations of accounting firms, banks, insurance companies, and most consumer
goods manufacturers. Under the majority of state statutes, any document related to the
day to day operations or future strategic plans of a business enterprise would not be
covered. For example, confidential financial data, customer and supplier lists, and
marketing plans do not fall under any category of scientific or technical information. See
supra notes 139 and 152 and accompanying text.
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confidential commercial, economic and business information in its
definition of a trade secret.168
The distinction between commercial, business information and
scientific, technical information is delineated in almost all of the
statutes.169 As one scholar explains, "this distinction was based on the
assumption that.. .scientific information usually constitute[s] ... a clearer
creative investment, deserving broader protection due to functional and
value considerations." 170 This distinction is clearly outdated and based
on faulty assumptions, as business and commercial information along
with financial data represent innovation, value and usefulness in the
same regard as scientific discovery, only in a different context. 1
Another justification for the distinction was that theft of scientific
information was easier to prove than certain types of commercial
information."'' This distinction may have some merit. 173 Although, with
the increasing value of proprietary business information, corporations
will have tighter methods of protection, allowing for easier proof of
theft.174 The limited and narrow definition of trade secrets under a
majority of state criminal law statutes prevents those statutes from
producing an adequate criminal deterrent.175
Second, most state statutes fail to proscribe many forms or modes of
transmission.176 Currently, of the thirty states with criminal statutory
protection for trade secrets, over one-half strictly limit the proscribed
modes of theft to corporeal acquisition and transmission.177 Corporeal
acquisition is limited to the physical carrying away of the actual item
that contains the trade secret."' 8 Corporeal transmission would include
copying or reproducing the secret information in a tangible object
separate from its original form and physically carrying away that
168 See supra notes 98-102
169 Lederman, supra note 121, at 962.
170 Id.
1n It's hard to argue that developing a scientific process that allows plants to grow at twice
the rate of speed deserves more protection than the invention a manufacturing process,
(such as the assembly line at Ford) or marketing plan, such as the Nike "Just Do It."
172 Lederman, supra note 121, at 962.
173 Id.
374 Id.
1"5 Id. at 947. The language of these statutes is clearly designed to cover and protect
scientific and technical information only.
176 Id.
177 ed.178 Lederman, supra note 121, at 948.
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separate object.179 The primary purpose of these statutes is not to protect
the value of the information contained in the object, but to protect the
physical article or object itself from theft.180 These statutes are designed
to maintain a physical, unbroken link between the information and the
physical object.181  For criminal liability to attach, the thief must
physically steal the original tangible object containing the trade secret or
a separate tangible object representing or embodying the trade secret.18
However, if the theft occurs through incorporeal transmission or
retention, such as memorization and subsequent disclosure,
communication, or exhibition, criminal liability would not attach.18
Furthermore, any theft by intangible means, such as transferring the data
by computer, would not trigger any criminal liability.18 In contrast, the
EEA approach covers all four modes of acquisition and transmission.185
These first two weaknesses of state law can be explained by the time
period in which they were drafted.18 6 The approaches promulgated by
the states were adequate twenty years ago, but are outdated and
deficient in today's global economy.'87
17 Id. at 950-4.
180 Id. at 947.
181 Id.
182 d.
183 Id. See supra notes 146-150. For example, an athletic apparel company may want to
produce a secret television marketing plan or strategy. The company designs and
reproduces the plan on a series of tangible objects or articles. If the thief views the plan and
communicated the information to a competitor, no criminal liability would accrue. For
criminal liability to accrue, the thief must steal the plans or reproduce the plans and steal
that separate object.
184 Lederman, supra note 121, at 947.
195 See supra note 103. Also, the state criminal statute of Delaware prohibits all four modes
of acquisition and transmission. See supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
186 Most of the state criminal law statutes were drafted in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Lederman, supra note 121, at 960. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
187 Today's economy renders most state statutes outdated for two reasons. The importance
of information to the political, social, and economic environment has grown substantially
in the past 20 years. Lederman, supra note 121, at 922. Information in all forms is a factor
vital to the appropriate and efficient functioning of governmental, economic, and social
systems. Id. Whereas the early 1900's were termed the "industrial revolution," the late
1990's has been termed the "information revolution." Id. at 923-25. This information
revolution has had an enormous impact on the global business environment. Id. at 922-23.
Information is not only the subject of transactions, but is also the driving force behind a
variety of large industries. Id. at 925. Like natural resources and energy sources,
information is an extremely important measurement of wealth and economic power. Id. at
926. Studies confirm that over 50% of the Gross National Product of the United States is
directly or indirectly connected to the formation and distribution of information. Id. at 925.
Coinciding with the information revolution, the strong competition in today's world
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A third weakness is the lack of uniformity among the state
statutes.188 Some states adequately protect the information content,
providing a comprehensive scope, coverage, and definition of qualifying
proprietary information.1' These same states, however, fail to proscribe
the most common mode and form of misappropriation and theft. 190 The
problem also reverses itself as many states provide a comprehensive
definition of the proscribed modes of transfer but fail to cover the
necessary proprietary information.191 Because of this deficiency, only
three states provide a comprehensive and uniform approach. 192
The penalty provisions in the majority of state criminal law statutes
present a fourth problem.193 The majority of states penalize the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential business information
with misdemeanor or low-class felony sanctions.'94 The combination of
markets has focused attention on securing the economic value of confidential commercial
information. Id. at 926. Businesses have reacted by actively protecting the secrecy of
important information such as business structures, development plans and business
connections. Id. However, state law has failed to address the "information revolution" in
criminal statutory legislation. The past 20 years have seen enormous technological
advances in the acquisition and transmission of information. Id. at 923. Computer
technology has provided the capacity for inexpensive data storage and processing. Id. at
922. Communication technology has allowed large amounts of data to be accessible and
capable of transmission to immediate and remote locations. Id. See supra note 19 detailing
the sophisticated methods of acquisition and transmission of confidential information.
188 This is exactly the opposite of state civil law approaches, in which all states generally
track the language of the UTSA producing uniform definitions and language throughout
all of the states. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
I See supra notes 138, 143, 154 and 157.
190 Florida and Minnesota are a representative example of the problems this causes. The
language of the statute defining trade secrets covers business and economic information.
Unless the theft occurs by corporeal acquisition or corporeal transmission, no criminal
liability exists. See supra notes 142-143.
91 For example Texas and California prohibit corporeal acquisition, corporeal transmission,
incorporeal transmission (exhibition or communication), and incorporeal retention. See
supra notes 148-150. However, both Texas and California limit protection to only scientific
or technical information. See supra note 152.
192 Colorado, Massachusetts, and Delaware proscribe all potential forms and modes of
transfer while protecting all forms of commercial information. Businesses in these three
states are well protected against theft and misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential business information. However, consider the deterrent effect on criminal
homicide if only 6% of the states had statutes directly proscribing murder. In the area of
trade secret protection, an adequate deterrent requires all states to adopt specific,
comprehensive, and uniform criminal statutory protection.
19 See infra note 194.
94 One interesting phenomenon is that Colorado, an exceptional example of a state criminal
statute in this area, provides only misdemeanor sanctions. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-4408
(West 1990). Arkansas and California also only provide misdemeanor sanctions, providing
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all four limitations in current state law approaches to this problem
demonstrate why companies have been reluctant to pursue prosecution
of these offenses in the past.195 To adequately protect the lifeblood of the
U.S. economy, state law needs to respond by providing a comprehensive,
powerful deterrent to the theft and misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential business information.
IV. MODEL CRIMINAL PENAL STATUTE
This Section of the Note proposes a model criminal statute that
directly addresses the theft and misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential proprietary business information. Providing one single
uniform and comprehensive statutory approach gives those states with
no criminal statutory protection an example upon which to pattern
future legislation.196 Furthermore, states with current criminal statutory
protection have the ability to amend and update their statutes to rectify
the lack of uniformity, remove the limitations on the proscribed modes
of acquisition and transmission, and to increase the scope and coverage
sentencing penalties of up to one year in prison. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-107 (Michie 1997);
CAL PENAL CODE § 499C (West Supp. 1999). Most states punish the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets through felony sanctions. A number of states provide a
minimum punishment of one year imprisonment and a maximum punishment of five years
imprisonment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-124 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
812.081 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-13 (1996); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 266
§ 30 (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07 (McKinney 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3930 (West supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-138 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 31.05 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1999). The only states
with severe penalty sanctions are Illinois and Minnesota. Illinois provides a minimum of
four years imprisonment with a maximum of 15 years. 720 ILL COMN. STAT. ANN. 5/15-8
(West 1993). Minnesota extends the maximum penalty to 10 years imprisonment. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.52(1) (West Supp. 1999). By contrast the EEA provides imprisonment up
to 10 years for domestic offenders and 15 years foreign offenders. See supra note 107. Stiff
felony penalties have the potential to deter criminal activity in a much greater fashion than
the slap on the wrist provided by misdemeanor sanctions. See supra notes 24-33 and
accompanying text.
19s Businesses in one-half of the states have no criminal remedies available. Many state
statutes do not cover business information. See supra notes 163-75. Other states fail to
sanction the most common modes of acquisition and transition. See supra notes 163-75.
These limitations make the investigation and prosecution of trade secret theft an expensive,
time consuming, and risky proposition. Under the current statutory framework in the
majority of states, prosecutors and companies recognize they face an uphill battle to
successful prosecution. Many companies will absorb the loss rather than invest more
money to wage an unsuccessful prosecution.
1% Currently, dose to 50% of states lack any criminal statutory protection for the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential proprietary business information. See
supra note 124.
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of information protected by expanding the existing narrow definition of
trade secrets in the statutes. 197
The model criminal statute consists of six chapters. Chapter One
identifies the prohibited conduct, affected parties, and penalty
provisions.198  Chapter Two postulates affirmative defenses to
prosecution for violation of the statute.199 Chapter Three provides
criminal forfeiture conditions.200 Chapter Four furnishes devices to
protect the confidentiality of the information during the criminal
proceedings and prosecution. 2 1 Chapter Five details the construction
and relation of this statute with other criminal and civil remedies
available to the victim.202 Chapter Five also incorporates a statute of
limitations. 2 3 Chapter Six categorizes and defines the relevant and
important terminology used in Chapters One through Five.2°4 Chapters
197 See supra notes 163-195 discussing the weaknesses in current state statutory law.
19 This chapter is primarily modeled after 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (1996) (EEA). Modifications
are made to include terms and phrases from various state statutes including California,
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, and Texas. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 499C (West Supp. 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408 (West 1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 857 (1995); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-13 (1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 1994). The penalty provisions
are modeled following the approach of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (1996) (EEA) and the state of
Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(1) (West Supp. 1999).
I" This chapter is modeled after the Pennsylvania approach, which is the only state or
federal statute which explicitly provides for affirmative defenses to the theft of trade secrets
and proprietary business information. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West Supp. 1998).
This chapter also follows California, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, stating explicitly what
actions will not be considered an affirmative defense to alleviate violation and prosecution
under the statute. See CAL PENAL CODE § 499C (West Supp. 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3930 (West Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1998).
2w This chapter is modeled after 18 U.S.C.A. § 1834 (1996) (EEA).
2m This chapter is modeled after 18 U.S.C.A. § 1835 (1996) (EEA) and the state of Georgia
approach. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-13 (1999).
2m This chapter is modeled after 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (1996) (EEA) and state law approaches
in Delaware, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 857 (1995); MASS.
GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 266 § 30 (West Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West
Supp.1998).
2w- The majority of state civil trade secret statutes provide a statute of limitations. However,
no state criminal law trade secret statutes affords any statute of limitations. With no state
criminal law to model a statute of limitations upon, the Note incorporates the approach of
the UTSA, discussed in supra note 22. Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 1-11, 14 U.L.A. 443
(1985).
2w This chapter combines aspects of § 1839 of the EEA with dozens of state law provisions,
explanations, definitions, and terminology, most notably incorporating aspects of
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408 (West 1990); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-124 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-13 (1996); MD. CODE ANN. CRim. LAw § 340(h)(11) (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
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One and Six represent the heart of the uniform, comprehensive,
exhaustive and explicit nature of the statute. Furthermore, each Chapter
contains a commentary section designed to explain each Chapter in more
detail.205
The statute endeavors to explicitly delineate prohibited conduct and
affected parties providing companies and individuals with prior notice
of unlawful conduct. More importantly, the model criminal statute also
endeavors to provide a powerful deterrent to the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential business information.
The model statute strives to achieve this goal with rigid penalty
provisions coinciding with comprehensive and definitive language
clearly designating the proscribed modes of theft and misappropriation,
while expanding the scope and coverage of the information content
protected under the statute. The statute furnishes companies and state
prosecutors with a powerful proactive weapon to combat the theft of
trade secrets and the misappropriation of confidential business
information. However, to properly utilize this weapon, all fifty states
should adopt or amend current statutes to follow this model criminal
statute.
A. Chapter 1: Theft of Trade Secrets and Confidential Proprietary Business
Information
(a) Any person who, with the intent to deprive, withhold or convert from
the owner thereof, the exclusive use or control of a trade secret
knowingly:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away,
transfers, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception acquires or
obtains knowledge or information of the trade secret; or
(2) without authorization accesses, copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, reproduces, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, discloses, exhibits, memorizes or conveys the trade
secret; or
609.52(1) (West Supp. 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07 (McKinney 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21,§ 1732 (West Supp. 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1998).
mThe commentary sections are employed to represent the history and explanation behind
the provisions and serve a similar purpose to legislative history sections of federal and
state law. Rather than repeat the analysis and assertions presented earlier in the Note, the
commentary section will provide a brief explanation and refer the reader to earlier portions
of the Note.
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(3) receives, buys, uses or possesses the trade secret, knowing the same
to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained or converted without
authorization; or
(4) completely or partially represents, depicts, describes, reflects or
records the trade secret;
(b) any person who attempts to commit any offense described in
paragraphs (1) through (4); or
(c) conspires with one or more persons to commit any offense described in
paragraphs (1) through (4) and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy; or
(d) wrongfully solicits another to commit any offense described in
paragraphs (1) through (4)
Commits the offense of the theft of a trade secret, and shall be fined not
more than $500,000 and imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. Any
organization that commits any offense described in subsections (a) through
(d) shall be fined not more than $ 5,000,000.
Commentary
Chapter 1 sets forth the prohibited conduct that triggers violation of
the statute. Generally, the language in paragraph (1) seeks to prohibit
corporeal acquisition and transmission.2°6 For example, paragraph (1)
punishes physically walking away with the tangible object containing
the trade secret. Paragraph (2) also seeks to prohibit corporeal
acquisition and transmission.2 7 For example, paragraph (2) punishes the
transmission of the trade secret into a separate tangible object which
embodies the trade secret. For instance, photocopying or reproducing
the trade secret in a separate tangible article is prohibited. Paragraphs
(2) and (4) prohibit incorporeal transmission of the trade secret. For
example, transmission by communication, exhibition, or disclosure
violates the statute. Paragraph (2) also punishes incorporeal retention of
a trade secret through the prohibition against memorization of the trade
secret.208 With these nontraditional methods, the original trade secret
This provision tracks the majority of state law approaches to date. See supra notes 177-
78.
N7 Prior federal and state criminal statutory law has also addressed these concerns. See
supra notes 59 and 179 and accompanying text.
2mThe statute seeks to proscribe any and all means of acquisition and transmission of trade
secrets and confidential commercial information. In today's technologically based
economy, the theft of trade secrets will most commonly occur through incorporeal
memorization and disclosure. This approach rectifies the problems witnessed by state law
approaches in the past which failed to proscribe the most common means of stealing
information. See supra notes 180-184.
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never leaves the dominion or control of the owner, but the unauthorized
exhibition or disclosure effectively destroys the value of the trade
secret.2°9 The intent is to ensure that the theft of intangible information is
prohibited in the same way that theft of physical items is protected.210
Generally, paragraph (3) fills in any holes in acquisition by punishing
unauthorized receipt, use, or possession. Paragraph (3) establishes a
punishment for using improper means used to acquire the trade secret.
Furthermore, the language of fraud and deception in paragraph (1) is
meant to punish illegal business conduct, but also seeks to provide a
disincentive for participation in immoral business conduct.
The language in paragraph (2) also serves to give the trade secret
owner the right to control activities such as duplication, reproduction,
exhibition and destruction, while punishing those who act against the
interests of the owner. Paragraph (2) also attempts to stifle violations of
confidential relationships through a prohibition against disclosure and
communication. Finally the language of paragraph (2) applies to
physical vandals and computer hackers who alter or destroy trade
secrets. Prohibiting and punishing these acts is as important as theft or
misappropriation to the protection of trade secrets.
Chapter 1 also outlines the affected parties under the statute.
Subsection (b) covers the thief, while subsections (c) and (d) cover other
parties involved in the theft. The language is deliberately broad, subject
to two inherent limitations. First the person must knowingly commit the
prohibited conduct. Second, the person must display criminal intent.
These limitations are designed to limit its applicability in doubtful cases,
where the person acted without knowledge that the actions were wrong.
The limitations are aimed at preventing prosecution for accidental
acquisition. A person who takes proprietary information or trade secrets
because of ignorance, mistake or accident should not be prosecuted
under this statute. For a person to be prosecuted, the person must know
or have a firm belief that he has no lawful right to obtain the
information.
Finally, the statute does not apply to innocent innovators or to
persons who seek to capitalize on their lawfully developed knowledge,
M" Currently, very few states recognize this aspect. See supra notes 146-47.
210 This remedies a recurring problem throughout current state criminal trade secret laws.
A significant portion of the states adequately treat the theft of tangible property, although
very few recognize the importance of protecting intangible property in the same manner as
the protection of tangible property. See supra note 184.
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skill, or abilities. For example, employees who change employers or start
their own companies should be able to apply their talents without fear of
prosecution. Chapter 1 attaches criminal liability for persons involved in
either the solicitation of a theft of trade secrets or a conspiracy to
unlawfully obtain a trade secret. Solicitation and conspiracy to steal
trade secrets present problems on the same or greater scale than
individual theft, and the statute will punish those persons severely.
Finally, Chapter 1 pronounces the criminal sanctions for violation of the
statute.211
B. Chapter 2: Defenses
(a) Defense: It shall be a complete defense to any prosecution under
Chapter 1 of this statute for the defendant to show that the information
comprising the trade secret was rightfully known or available to him
from a source other than the owner of the trade secret.
(b) In a prosecution for a violation of Chapter 1 of this statute, it shall be
no defense that the defendant returned or intended to return the
information or trade secret involved or that the defendant destroyed all
copies or reproductions made.
Commentary
Chapter 2 sets forth one affirmative defense available to the
defendant to quash criminal prosecution. The language is constructed to
prohibits prosecution if the trade secret or information was published,
disseminated, disclosed or has otherwise become a matter of general
public knowledge through the actions of the trade secret owner.
C. Chapter 3: Criminal Forfeiture
(a) The court shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that
the defendant forfeit to the state:
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such
violation; and
(2) any property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part,
to commit or facilitate the commission of such violation.
211 These sanctions are meant to provide a powerful deterrent to alleviate the problem
witnessed by most state statutes in the past, misdemeanor and low-grade felony sanctions.
See supra notes 193-194.
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Commentary
Chapter 3 is designed to sanction the individual thief or enterprise
devising the criminal theft by requiring any proceeds or property
obtained or used to commit the theft to be forfeited to the state.
Naturally, the state should return any appropriate property to the
victim, such as the actual trade secret or confidential information.
However, the state should be entitled to retain the excess property and
proceeds to offset the expense of prosecution and to allow for adequate
resources for the prosecution of future cases. These forfeiture provisions
supplement, rather than replace, the authorized monetary punishments
set forth in Chapter 1.
D. Chapter 4: Orders to Preserve Confidentiality
(a) In a prosecution for any violation of this statute, a court shall preserve
the secrecy of the trade secret or confidential information by reasonable
means, which may include:
(1) granting protective orders in connection with the discovery
proceedings
(2) holding in camera hearings
(3) sealing the records of the proceedings
(4) ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose any
aspect of the trade secret or confidential information without prior
court approval
Commentary
This chapter alleviates the concerns of the trade secret owner. A
public discovery process and prosecution inevitably will expedite the
disclosure of the trade secret or confidential information to large
numbers of individuals and groups. Exposure of the confidential trade
secret destroys its worth and value. As an incentive for businesses to
seek prosecution, the court shall take necessary and appropriate
measures to protect the secrecy and confidentiality of the information.
Without such a provision, the trade secret owner may be reluctant to
cooperate in prosecutions.
E. Chapter 5: Construction with Other Laws
(a) This statute shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other
remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by the United States
Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the theft
or misappropriation of a trade secret.
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(b) An action for theft or misappropriation of a trade secret shall be
brought within three years after the theft or misappropriation is
discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been
discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continuing theft or
misappropriation constitutes a single claim.
Commentary
Chapter 5 allows companies and businesses that are the victims of
theft of trade secrets the ability to pursue state civil law remedies and
federal criminal law remedies. This chapter also provides a statute of
limitations. The statute of limitations tolls upon discovery of the theft or
misappropriation of the trade secret or when the company, acting with
reasonable diligence should have discovered the theft.
F. Chapter 6: Definitions
As used in Chapters 1 through 5:
(a) The term trade secret means all forms and types, whether the whole or
any portion or phase thereof, offinancial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including but not limited to:
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs,
codes, customer listings, supplier listings, sales listings, or any other
information relating to any business or profession, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing;if
(1) the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and
(2) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by other persons or by the
public.
(b) The term "person" means any individual, sole proprietorship,
partnership, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, limited liability
company, association, joint venture, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity or
enterprise.
(c) The term "owner" means the person or entity in whom or in which
rightful legal title or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is
reposed.
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(d) The phrase "without authorization" means without permission of the
owner.
(e) The phrase "intent to deprive" means to withhold the trade secret
permanently or for such a period of time or under circumstances as to
appropriate any portion of its economic benefit or value, or with the
intent to restore the trade secret to the owner only upon payment of a
reward or other compensation, or to dispose of the trade secret so as to
make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(f) The term "appropriate" means to exercise any control over the trade
secret.
Commentary
Chapter 6 includes the definitions for terms and phrases used
throughout the statute and should govern if any dispute arises as to the
meanings of the terms or phrases used throughout the statute. The term
"trade secret" is broadly defined to cover all confidential business
information, whether tangible or intangible that accords the owner any
competitive advantage over competitors or other persons. For example,
the term trade secret encompasses strategic business plans, financial or
sales data, reports or plans, manufacturing or production processes or
techniques, marketing strategies, data compilations on consumers and
suppliers and computer programs or codes. The term "trade secret"
should be interpreted in an expansive way, subject only to the limitations
of value and secrecy.212
The requirement that the owner take reasonable measures to protect
the secrecy of the trade secret should be construed to mean that the (1)
owner regards or specifically identifies the trade secret or information as
confidential, (2) the information is not available to anyone other than the
owner or selected persons having access for limited purposes with the
consent of the owner, and (3) the owner has not published or otherwise
made the information known as a matter of general public interest. If the
an owner fails to safeguard the trade secret, then no one can be rightfully
accused of stealing or misappropriating the information.
212 The language of the statute remedies the main problem with prior state law approaches.
Prior state law in the majority of jurisdictions limited prosecution to theft of purely
scientific information. Prior state law approaches failed to explicitly cover business,
economic, and commercial information. See supra notes 164-65.
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V. CONCLUSION
Criminal theft and misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential business information represents the greatest single problem
facing U.S. corporations in the next century. Businesses not only face the
threat from foreign corporations and governments, but also from
domestic rivals and competitors. To combat this serious problem and
provide the maximum deterrent power, businesses, and companies need
strong, comprehensive and proactive criminal laws. The federal
government has addressed the problem of foreign corporations and
foreign governments targeting U.S. corporations through the passage of
the EEA. All fifty states have the ability and power to remedy the
domestic side of the problem by adopting a uniform, comprehensive,
and proactive criminal statutory approach. The states have the
capability and the authority; all they need is the aspiration, desire and a
set of proper tools to duplicate. The model criminal statute proposed in
this Note furnishes the states with the tools necessary to enact
comprehensive, proactive, and ground breaking criminal legislation.
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